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This thesis reports on a study conducted to determine the
feasibility of using a sampling technique within the
Department of the Navy to compare in-house motor vehicle costs
with the costs that would be incurred were the General
Services Administration or a civilian fleet management
contractor employed to meet the Navy's motor vehicle needs.
Such cost comparison studies are required by the Consolidated
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On April 7, 1986 the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation
Act (COBRA) of 1985 was signed into law. This Act established
the United States federal budget for Fiscal Year 1986.
Consistent with a common Congressional practice, this piece of
legislation was also used by Congress to set policies and give
directions that were not specifically related to the primary
function of the Act. One such manifestation of this practice
is found in Chapter 20 of COBRA. This Chapter requires, among
other things, that all Federal Agencies complete studies that
compare their in-house costs of providing motor vehicle
transportation to the costs of obtaining these services from
the General Services Administration (GSA) or a commercial
provider [Ref 1]. This requirement was obviously an attempt on
the part of Congress to insure that the Federal government
meets its motor vehicle needs as cost effectively as possible.
This requirement placed no small burden on Federal
Agencies. Little specific guidance with regard to
interpreting the law and implementing its requirements was
provided. Consequently, a multitude of questions arose
regarding COBRA's requirements. To date many of these
questions remain at least partially unanswered. For this
reason, the Department of the Navy (DON) has made little
progress in developing a plan to complete the studies required
by COBRA.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY
The researcher was advised that the most pressing issue
for DoN, with regard to COBRA Chapter 20, was the need to
develop a general approach to completing the cost comparison
studies (Ref. 2]. The Navy, of course, was interested in using
the lowest cost process that could be shown to yield reliable
results to complete the studies. The most promising potential
strategy that had been identified was the possible use of a
sampling technique.
Such a technique, if found to be feasible, would allow DoN
to perform in-depth cost studies at selected activities and
determine from the results of these studies if the larger
group of activities represented by the sample group were
meeting their transportation needs at costs competitive with
GSA and the commercial sector. If such inferences could be
drawn it might, then, be possible to preclude the need to
expend the substantial amount of time and money that would be
necessary to complete an in-depth cost study at each Naval
activity. The feasibility of using such a technique depended
mainly upon the extent to which Naval activities could be
categorized by similarities in their unit transportation
costs.
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C. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The overriding question this thesis undertook to address
is the feasibility of using a sampling technique to complete
the studies required by Chapter 20 of COBRA. Such a technique
would only be justifiable in groups of activities with very
similar unit costs of providing motor vehicle transportation.
The research for this thesis was conducted, then, in the hope
of determining, through a study of the unit transportation
costs of a group of activities, if the use of a sampling
technique was justifiable.
D. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
A very natural follow-on question to the main question
addressed by this thesis is: Are Naval activities, in general,
competitive with GSA and the commercial sector in meeting
their motor vehicle needs? So natural was this question that
the researcher had to make a conscious effort not to be
sidetracked by it. The purpose of this study was to determine
the degree of -imilarity between in-house Navy transportation
costs, not the degree of competitiveness with outside
providers.
The researcher began this study with the hope of also
studying the question of how activities should be grouped
when bids for transportation services are solicited from GSA
and civilian fleet management contractors. It was recognized
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that factors other than similarities in transportation costs
bore on this question. For example, a study of transportation
costs might have shown that within functional categories
activities have very similar costs. It is conceivable,
though, that some factors unrelated to cost similarity (e.g.,
desires to allow Public Works Centers to "bid" on activities
in their area, or to make the administration of any contracts
resulting from the study more simple) might imply that
activities should be grouped by region, not function, when
bids are solicited. The level of effort required to address
the primary issue of this study, though, precluded the
possibility of looking substantively into this second
question.
E. LIMITATIONS TO THE STUDY
Three main limiting factors are notable with regard to the
study effort reported on by this thesis. Two of these were
imposed upon the researcher by the nature of the data
gathered. The other, the researcher himself imposed on the
study effort. Each of these limits the conclusions that can
be drawn from the data analysis in some way. The first also
limited the scope of the study.
1. Lack of available data
The researcher initially hoped to study Naval
activities representing a wide range of functions, sizes, and
regions. It was discovered, though, that transportation cost
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data at many activities were not available. The only type of
activity found to consistently maintain the type of cost data
needed for this study was Naval Air Stations. The scope of
this study was reduced accordingly. The modified goal of the
study became to determine the degree of similarity in
transportation costs at Naval Air Stations.
2. Questionable quality of the data collected
The researcher was advised that the cost data provided
by activities were, in some cases, inaccurate. In the data
analysis process the researcher observed a number of apparent
discrepancies in the data collected. The researcher felt,
then, that the ability to reach definitive conclusions based
on the data was limited by the level of doubt that existed
about the quality of the data.
3. Cost data were studied for only one year
The researcher recognized that it would be impossible,
within the time available to complete this thesis, to study in
detail, cost records from more than one year. Cost data from
fiscal year 1992, then, were the only data examined. This
limitation increased the probability that some of the data
collected might be reflective of a rare situation and not be
representative, therefore, of normal transportation costs.
Though no evidence was uncovered during the data analysis to




The primary assumption made by the researcher in
developing the study methodology was that the only costs
relevant to the questions being addressed by this thesis were
direct fuel, labor, and materials costs. The researcher
assumed that the overhead-type costs (procurement, disposal,
management, and administrative costs) were similar between
activities and, so, were irrelevant to the effort to determine
the degree of similarity among the transportation costs of
Naval activities. Since all Naval activities procure and
dispose of their vehicles through the same two organizations,
the assumption with regard to unit procurement and disposal
costs is felt to be valid. Toward the end of the study,
however, the researcher began to doubt the assumption
regarding the irrelevance of management and administrative
expenses in activities' transportation organizations. The
researcher's conclusions in this regard are discussed briefly
in Section H of this chapter, and more fully in Chapter VI.
G. STUDY METHODOLOGY
The collection and analysis of cost data on each activity
was the cornerstone of the study effort for this thesis. The
researcher recognized, though, that there existed many
nonfinancial factors that likely influence transportation
costs. An effort was made then, primarily through interviews
with Navy transportation experts, to identify the nonfinancial
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factors most likely to significantly influence transportation
costs. The researcher sought to gather about each activity,
facts on these nonfinancial characteristics. The cost data
were analyzed with reference to different combinations of
nonfinancial characteristics. This was done in the hope of
identifying the activity-specific characteristics that affect
transportation costs at Naval activities. Such an
identification would possibly have justified using a sampling
technique to complete the COBRA studies within groups sharing
a set of nonfinancial characteristics.
H. CONCLUSIONS
1. Data do not justify using a sampling technique
The data gathered proved to be of doubtful quality,
widely dispersed, and completely unpredictable in their
fluctuations. The latter two characteristics taken together,
in the opinion of the researcher, indicate that the data are,
in general, unreliable. Given these facts, it is impossible
to determine from this study if sampling would be a valid
approach to completing the COBRA studies. It can only be said
that the data analysis of this study provides no justification
for such an approach.
2. Difficulty in identifying a set of cost driving
factors
The researcher analyzed the data with reference to a
number of nonfinancial characteristics of activities and their
7
vehicle fleets. It is conceivable that different combinations
of these characteristics are the primary cost drivers at
different activities. It is also likely that there are other
factors that influence transportation costs at Naval
activities. It may be impossible, then, to identify a generic
set of characteristics that prove to be consistently
predictive of activity transportation costs.
3. Need for improvement in the Navy's transportation cost
reporting system
This conclusion is an obvious follow-on to the first
conclusion cited. The apparent lack of a reliable cost
reporting system among Navy transportation organizations is a
significant deficiency. It will likely make completing the
COBRA studies more difficult. If the Navy proves, as a result
of studies based on the existing data, to be a less cost
effective provider of transportation than GSA or civilian
contractors, one possible explanation is that the system in
place for tracking costs is ineffective. Clearly it will be
difficult for Navy transportation organizations to operate as
effectively and efficiently as the current austere budget
environment requires without a more reliable cost reporting
system.
4. Relevance of management and administrative expenses
It is not clear whether the size of the administrative
and managerial staffs at transportation organizations is more
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related to fleet size, level of usage or other factors.
Without investigating this issue it is not valid to assume
that these costs will not affect the degree of similarity in
transportation costs between activities. Given the generally
poor quality of the data evaluated for this thesis, though,
incorrectly assuming these costs to be irrelevant to the
question at hand proved to have no affect on the conclusions
made.
I. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Plan first studies such that results might indicate if
sampling is possible
Given the questions about the quality of the data
analyzed for this study, no conclusion is possible about the
existence or absence of transportation cost similarities
between activities. The potential cost savings of using a
sampling technique to complete the studies are too significant
to eliminate it as an option. In choosing the first
activities where COBRA cost studies will be conducted,
consideration should be given to what comparisons of the
results of these studies might imply with regard to the
possibility of using sampling for future studies.
2. Improve transportation cost reporting
The conclusion about the current cost system stated in
section H above shows why this is necessary. The lack of
training among transportation employees with respect to the
9
reporting system, the problems with the computers and software
used to produce the cost reports, and the reliance upon
several different organizations to prepare the reports all
need to be addressed if the system is to be improved.
J. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Chapter II is a detailed discussion of the problems
presented to DoN by COBRA and the process by which the
researcher defined the area of study for this thesis. Chapter
III explains the specifics of how the activities to be studied
were chosen, how it was decided what data to gather, and how
the data were gathered. The data that were gathered are
presented along with some broad observations about them in
Chapter IV. The in-depth data analysis and interpretation
process is described in Chapter V. Chapter VI presents the
main conclusions the study generated, some recommendations
relative to the conclusions, and some issues related to this
study that need to be researched further.
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II. BACKGROUND
Chapter 20 of the COBRA is entitled Federal Motor Vehicle
Expenditure Control. Section 905 of this Chapter requires
that
each executive agency, including the Department of
Defense, shall conduct a comprehensive and detailed study
of the costs, benefits, and feasibility of--
(A) relying on the Interagency Management Fleet system
operated by the Administrator;
(B) entering into a contract with a qualified fleet
management firm or another private contractor; or
(C) using any other means less costly to the Government,
to meet its motor vehicle operation, maintenance, leasing,
acquisition, and disposal requirements.
(2) each study conducted under paragraph (1) shall compare
the costs, benefits and feasibility of the alternatives
described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of such
paragraph to the costs and benefits of the agency's
current motor vehicle operations and, in the case of the
alternatives described in subparagraphs (B) and (C) of
such paragraph, to costs, benefits, and feasibility of the
use of the Interagency Fleet Management System operated by
the Administrator. (Ref. 1)
Section 913 of this Chapter defines "the Administrator", as
used in Section (A) in the above quote, as the Administrator
of GSA. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is
responsible for ensuring the enforcement of COBRA's
requirements.
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The requirements set forth above can be summarized as
follows: Each Federal Agency shall compare their current costs
of providing, maintaining, operating, and disposing of their
vehicle fleets to the costs that would be incurred were GSA,
or a civilian fleet management contractor, employed to provide
those services. "Operating", as it applies here, means to
provide fuel. Civil service or military drivers will still be
required. Although the law does not specifically require that
the least costly alternative be used, clearly that is the
intent.
There have been many questions and many problems generated
because of the requirements discussed above. Largely as a
result of these, to date, DoN has made little progress toward
complying with COBRA. The following section is a brief
discussion of some of the major questions and problems. The
multi-faceted nature of this problem helps explain DoN's lack
of action in responding to Chapter 20 of COBRA. It is hoped
that this section will help the reader appreciate the somewhat
chaotic environment in which this issue has evolved.
A. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY CHAPTER 20 OF
COBRA.
1. Which vehicles?
What motor vehicles did the law refer to? Obviously
all passenger-type vehicles, i.e., those that GSA commonly
provides, would be included in the COBRA studies. However,
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the types of vehicles owned and operated by Federal Agencies
range from motor scooters to industrial cranes. Neither GSA
nor any individual fleet management contractor can provide the
full range of vehicles used by Federal Agencies. Chapter 20
of COBRA allows GSA to identify the "special purpose vehicles"
that are not to be included in the studies [Ref. 1]. Until
these vehicles were designated the studies could not be
completed.
2. What about the CA studies?
How did the requirements of COBRA affect the
Commercial Activities (CA) studies already completed,
currently underway, and scheduled for the future? Department
of Defense (DoD) Instruction 4100. 33 requires that commercial
organizations be offered the opportunity to provide a wide
range of services on military installations if it can be shown
that they can do so more cost effectively than a civil service
or military organization [Ref. 3]. Commercial organizations
are to be offered this opportunity by way of a sealed bidding
process. If a responsive bid (i.e., a realistic bid from a
legitimate organization) with a bid amount lower than the
government in-house estimate is received, a contract is to be
let to the low-bid organization to provide the relevant
services.
Typically when a CA study is done, a wide variety of
services of a public works nature (utilities, facilities,
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transportation, etc.) are put out for bid as a package. At
the time COBRA was signed into law, transportation fleet
management had already been put out for bid as a part of one
of these larger bid packages at many activities. Were bids
now to be solicited for just the transportation function at
these activities? Should the transportation function be put
out for bid separately in the future? The answer to these
questions was contingent upon the answer to a more basic
question.
3. What kind of study is required?
Chapter 20 of COBRA required only that studies be done
and comparisons be made. No method was specified for making
any changes that the results of the studies might recommend.
Would a CA type bidding process for just the transportation
function be necessary?
4. Now to "level the playing field"?
Given the differences in the way military/civil
service organizations, GSA, and civilian organizations are
operated and funded, how could costs of these organizations be
evaluated to determine which organization would truly be the
low cost provider? This question became known as the "level
playing field" issue.
Military organizations procure vehicles with one set
of funds through the Civil Engineer Support Office (CESO),
operate and maintain them at the activity level with another
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set of funds, and credit yet a third account with any money
collected from the resale of vehicles accomplished through the
widely dispersed branch offices of the Defense Reuse
Management Office (DRMO). With such a fragmented fleet
management organization and accounting system, precisely
answering the question of how much it costs to provide
transportation is not a trivial matter.
In the CA study process, transportation cost
comparisons were made strictly on the basis of operation and
maintenance costs. This is because it was assumed that a
successful bidder would simply assume operation and
maintenance responsibilities for the existing fleet.
Procurement and disposal would continue to be accomplished
through military organizations; therefore, these costs would
be common between the two bids and irrelevant to the "low
cost" question. GSA, though, provides its own procurement and
disposal services. A government cost estimate then will have
to include procurement and disposal costs to be comparable to
a GSA estimate. The task of gathering these costs and
matching them to the appropriate activity will be formidable.
It will entail determining what portion of the costs of many
different organizations/functions (fuel farms, supply
warehouses, NAVFAC and its field offices, controller's
department, CESO, and DRMO) relate to the procurement,
operation, maintenance, and disposal of vehicles at individual
activities.
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New costs that will be incurred by the government if
fleet management responsibilities are given to GSA or a
contractor must also be identified and considered if a true
cost comparison is to be made. Contract administration
expenses and transition expenses (costs to convert to a new
provider) are the primary examples of such costs. Likewise,
care must be taken to recognize in-house transportation costs
that won't completely go away if a conversion is made to
another fleet management organization. For example, in some
cases, vehicle mechanics also double as vehicle operators
[Ref. 4). Since neither GSA nor a contractor would be
expected to provide drivers for the vehicle fleet, it would be
incorrect to assume all labor costs would be totally
eliminated if another provider was brought in.
5. Public Works Center (PWC) consolidations and Defense
Business Operating Fund (DBOF) conversions
Navy PWC's are regional organizations that can provide
a wide range of public works services, including motor vehicle
fleet management, to Naval activities in their area. DBOF is
a recent DoD funding innovation designed to make defense
activities more aware of their cost of doing business and
correspondingly, it is hoped, more cost effective.
Organizations using DBOF finance their operations from a
revolving fund and bill the recipients of their services.
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In concert with DoD cost cutting mandates, the Navy
has been in the process of using PWC's to provide public works
services to more and more activities. Likewise many
activities have been converting to the DBOF method of funding
their operations in an attempt to become more cost effective.
The Navy's dilemma is in deciding whether or not to continue
these time and labor intensive PWC conversions and DBOF
consolidations for the transportation function, when the
studies required by COBRA Chapter 20 may result in that
function being taken over by GSA or a contractor.
6. Lack of manpower and money to complete studies
Budget cuts within the DoD have made it difficult for
many organizations to fulfill their primary mission
requirements. The COBRA cost studies promise to be time and
labor intensive. Devising a means to satisfy organizational
mission requirements and the law is the greatest challenge
COBRA presents to the Navy. This study was carried out to
help the Navy respond to that challenge.
B. THE QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS ADDRESSED
The DoN has sought guidance from DoD about how to deal
with the problems discussed in Section A [Ref 5]. In turn
DoD has raised the issues with OMB. Consequently, some of the
issues have been resolved. The most problematic ones have
not, however [Ref. 6].
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NAVFAC has protested the fact that COBRA allows GSA to
designate "special purpose" vehicles to be excluded from the
studies (Ref. 4]. No response to this protest has been
received nor any clarification provided as to what types of
vehicles will be so designated.
No real lenience has been offered with regard to
previously completed, or currently underway, CA studies. If
the outcome of a CA study was that transportation had been
kept in-house, in-house transportation costs would have to be
compared again to the private sector and, now, also to GSA.
If, as a result of a CA study, the transportation function was
now provided by a contractor, at the expiration of the
contract the COBRA cost studies would have to be done.
Similarly, activities in the process of completing a CA study
were, and still are, faced with the possible prospect of
completing that study only to be tasked to complete another
more complex study, just on transportation. [Ref. 7]
The question of what kind of study COBRA requires appears
to be effectively answered. Draft OMB guidance has been
issued in this regard [Ref. 8]. The intent apparently is to
use the same format as applies to CA studies, i.e., a bidding
process pitting any in-house organization against GSA and
civilian contractors. This guidance has, however, yet to be
finalized.
DoD has likewise forwarded to the services a Cost
Comparison Handbook in response to the issue of "leveling the
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playing field" [Ref. 9]. This handbook was developed by a
consultant working for GSA. Its guidance has not completely
satisfied DoN on this issue but, at this point, appears to be
the final word on the question.
The complications presented by trying to satisfy the
requirements of COBRA with a scarcity of people and money
while, at the same time, staying on track with PWC
consolidations and DBOF conversions have not, and are not
expected to be addressed. Because of these problems DoN has
made little progress in complying with COBRA.
Unfortunately for DoN, its lack of action has not gone
unnoticed by Congress. The Fiscal Year 1991 DoD authorization
bill cut the Navy's non-tactical vehicle operating and
maintenance budget by $10 million. The House Armed Services
Committee justified this cut by saying:
The committee does not believe the services, except for
the Army, have taken steps to reduce vehicle operating
costs by considering alternative means for acquiring,
operating, and maintaining their fleets. The committee
believes immediate action by the military services is
needed to study means for reducing their overall vehicle
costs. To ensure that this issue receives prompt
management attention, the committee recommends reducing
the services' O&M authorization request for non-tactical
vehicles by $26 million.... [Ref. 10]
The report goes on to set the Navy's share of this cut at $10
million.
A combination of the budget cut and the clarification on
what type of studies are required by COBRA has prompted the
Navy to begin considering in more detail the possible
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strategies they might pursue to comply with COBRA. The next
section discusses the strategies considered and how this study
was undertaken in an attempt to help determine what the best
approach may be.
C. ALTERNATIVES FOR COMPLETING THE COBRA STUDIES
When the researcher began study of this issue, he was
presented with a point paper prepared by the NAVFAC
Transportation Director that outlined several strategies that
had been considered for completing the COBRA studies (Ref.
11]. In order of descending cost and ascending desirability
these are:
1. Study activities and solicit bids for them individually.
2. Study activities individually but solicit bids for
groups of activities. Activities might be grouped by
function, sixe region, claimant, etc.
3. Study and solicit bids on a sample of activities. Again
these activities might be grouped by a variety of
characteristics. Based on the results of the bidding on
the sample activities, the entire category of activities
would either remain in-house or be converted to a GSA or
contractor supported activity.
In studying these alternatives the researcher came to the
conclusion that the highest priority should be given to
determining whether using a sampling strategy, as described in
alternative three above, is feasible. This alternative
clearly would be the most cost effective and least time
consuming way to comply with the COBRA requirements.
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Accordingly, answering that question became the focus of this
thesis. The following section discusses in general terms the
approach used to determine the feasibility of using a sampling
technique.
D. DETERMINING THE FEASIBILITY OF USING SAMPLING
For sampling to be a justifiable technique there needs to
be some assurance that the results of a bidding process at the
sample activities would be the same as those that would be
achieved if the other activities in the group were competed
individually. Though contractor bid amounts cannot be
reliably predicted, GSA rental rates for all the vehicles they
provide are matters of public record [Ref. 12]. A GSA
representative stated in a phone conversation with the
researcher that their published rates could be used to give a
good idea of what GSA's bid would be for a group of vehicles
[Ref 13]. Assuming, as NAVFAC is doing, that GSA is the real
competition, it would be expected that activities that have
very similar costs of providing administrative vehicle fleet
management would fare much the same in the bidding process
[Ref. 11]. If, then, Naval activities can be divided into
categories based on their cost of providing administrative
vehicle fleet management, the COBRA cost studies could be
accomplished in these categories by using a sampling
technique. The researcher focussed most of his efforts on
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ascertaining the relative similarity, or lack thereof, of
Naval activity fleet management costs.
A brief elaboration on what the researcher means by "fleet
management costs" is appropriate here. First, it is important
to note that only a similarity in some sort of unit cost can
imply the sort of comparability searched for in this study.
Two activities, with vehicle fleets composed of very different
types of vehicles could, by coincidence, have very similar
bottom line costs of providing their fleets. Unless their
unit costs of providing the fleets are very similar, though,
it would not be expected that they would be similarly
competitive with GSA. The particular unit cost the researcher
used to compare activities was dollars per type of vehicle per
mile driven.
Second, it must be pointed out that only fuel, parts, and
direct labor, were deemed to be relevant to the question
addressed. Procurement costs, and disposal costs were assumed
to be similar between activities and therefore irrelevant to
the question of similarity. Since all Naval vehicles are
procured and disposed of by CESO and DRMO, respectively, this
was felt to be a reasonable assumption. Indirect costs, such
as supervisory and administrative expenses, were throughout
the data collection period assumed to be similar between
activities and also irrelevant to the question addressed by
this study. After the data analysis was complete this
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assumption was reconsidered. The researcher's conclusions
about this matter are addressed in Chapter VI.
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To proceed with the study the researcher had to decide on
three major issues. What activities should be studied? What
information should be gathered to allow calculation of the
desired cost per type of vehicle per mile driven ? And, what
other information, besides cost data, should be gathered about
the activities? Section A, B, and C of this Chapter record
how the researcher addressed these three questions. Section
D describes the data gathering process.
A. WHAT ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE STUDIED?
Inasmuch as the purpose of the study would be to discover
if it is possible to categorize Naval activities by their
vehicle fleet management costs, it seemed reasonable to first
divide them by some other broad characteristics that might
have some affect on transportation costs. The characteristics
used to make these divisions were largely determined by what
summary information was already available.
The summary database the researcher found to contain the
most relevant data in this regard is called the Shore Civil
Engineering Support Equipment (CESE) Allowance Summary
(Ref. 14]. This database is maintained by CESO as a part of
the Construction, Automotive and Specialization Equipment
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Management Information System (CASEMIS). It separates
activities by claimant and reports on the size of their
vehicle fleets as well as the general composition of the
fleets.
Given the available information, the researcher decided to
initially group activities by four characteristics: function
(e.g., Air Stations, Shipyards, Subases, etc.), region,
vehicle fleet size, and vehicle fleet composition (i.e.,
percentage of fleet that is sedans, small trucks, heavy
trucks, etc.). It was felt that, once activities were divided
by function, it would be quite easy to choose out of this
category activities of different fleet sizes located in
different regions. At that point it remained to be seen how
the fleet compositions would compare between different
activities.
The researcher recognized that it would be impossible to
study activities from every functional category. To study a
representative sample of activities from among every type of
activity would have been well beyond the scope of this study.
Accordingly, the researcher focussed on functional categories
of groups having either a large number of activities or a
large number of vehicles (i.e., a large fleet size per
activity).
Appendix A is the original spreadsheet developed for the
purpose of categorizing activities. The activities included
in this Table own approximately 73% of the vehicles relevant
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to the requirements of COBRA. This Table summarizes the fleet
composition information contained in the CASEMIS report. The
fleets of each activity are broken down into four broad
categories of vehicle type: 01 vehicles (sedans, busses, and
station wagons), 02 vehicles (ambulances, vans, and work
trucks), 03 vehicles (pickup trucks, larger vans), and 04
vehicles (large trucks). The percentage of the fleet
represented by each of these categories was calculated for
each activity. The average and standard deviation of these
percentages were calculated for each functional category of
activity to give a general indication of the typical fleet
composition within that category of activity. In comparing
the fleet compositions within types of activities, it appeared
clear that, in general, fleet composition was closely related
to activity function.
With the information in Appendix A, the researcher
developed a process to choose the individual activities that
would be studied. It was deemed desirable to make comparisons
between two activities that were very similar in all but one
of the four broad characteristics described above. For
example, a comparison might be made between two activities
with the same function, similar fleet size, and similar fleet
composition, but located in different regions. The notion is,
of course, that several comparisons of that type might give
evidence that transportation costs either are or are not
dependent upon location. Similar comparisons could be made to
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isolate activity function, vehicle fleet size, or fleet
composition. Throughout the remainder of this thesis,
comparisons will be referred to according to the
characteristic they seek to isolate (e.g., a comparison made
that isolates fleet size will be referred to as a fleet size
comparison).
An intensive review of the spreadsheet reproduced in
Appendix A resulted in the identification of 85 different
activities that might be used to make at least one comparison
of the type described above. The researcher felt that no more
than 30 activities could be looked at for this study, so a
process of paring down this list of activities was initiated.
It was recognized from the list that the candidate
activities for comparisons isolating region, fleet size, and
function were much more readily available than for comparisons
isolating fleet composition. This came as no surprise. To
make a comparison isolating fleet composition as the
dissimilar characteristic meant comparing two activities of
the same type, with similar fleet sizes, and in the same
region, but with different fleet compositions. As mentioned
previously, fleet composition was generally found to be quite
consistent within functional categories. It was then much
more difficult to identify candidates for such comparisons.
In consideration of the above, the first activities
eliminated were those useful for only one comparison, unless
that one comparison was a fleet composition comparison. This
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reduced the number of activities to a more manageable size.
From this point, the activity selection process was a matter
of attempting to include representative samples of a number
of functional groups, all major regions of the country, a wide
range of fleet sizes, and Navy Industrial Fund activities.
The end result of this process was a list of 27 activities.
Represented by this list were 10 different types of activity,
every different region of the country, and every different
range of fleet sizes. With the activities identified the next
step was to gather the data needed to make the planned
comparisons.
B. FINDING COST DATA
Identifying the most likely source for the cost data
needed for this study was not difficult. The researcher was
informed that both the Navy Comptroller Manual and the NAVFAC
P-300 require the Transportation Director at Naval activities
to prepare annually and submit to NAVFAC a Transportation Cost
Report (TCR). Figure 1 is a list of the data contained in an
activity's TCR. Included in these reports is precisely the
information needed (mileage, fuel dollars, labor dollars, and
material dollars within each vehicle category group) to
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": Cost account code for each Alpha code category of vehicle.
" The average number of vehicles in inventory within each
Alpha code.
"* The number of downtime hours within each Alpha code.
"* The number of miles driven within each Alpha code.
"* The number of civilian and military man-hours expended
maintaining each Alpha code.
* The amount of wages paid to military and civilian employees
directly traceable to each Alpha code.
* The dollar amount spent for parts and other materials for
each Alpha code.
* The amount paid to commercial sources for any maintenance
received within each Alpha code.
"* The number of gallons of fuel used in each Alpha code.
"2 The dollar amount spent for fuel in each Alpha code.
Data Included in the Transportation Cost Report
Figure 1
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compute the unit cost figures desired. The researcher was
advised that, though for the study being undertaken the TCR
would be the best source of data, the information in the TCR's
was often of doubtful quality [Ref. 15].
C. DETERMINING WHAT OTHER DATA SHOULD BE GATHERED AND HOW TO
GATHER THEM
It was recognized that there were factors that might
influence an activity's transportation costs other than type
of activity, size of fleet, composition of fleet, and activity
location. To try to identify the most important of these
factors the researcher questioned several long-time Navy
transportation workers [Ref. 15, 16, 17, 18]. Two other
potentially relevant factors identified in these conversations
were fleet age and vehicle assignments (i.e., whether vehicles
at a given activity are predominantly assigned to an
organization or are predominantly motor pool vehicles). Other
factors the researcher wts curious about in this regard were
the number of mechanics at each activity and their wage
grades, the number of managerial and administrative personnel
at each activity and their wage grades, the extent to which
each activity had kept up with the desired preventative
maintenance schedule, and the cost of living in the area of
each activity. The remainder of this section explains why
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each of these factors might affect an activity's
transportation costs and discusses the steps taken to gather
information on them.
1. Fleet Age
Certainly one would expect that older vehicles would
be more costly to maintain than new vehicles. A body of
information important to this study then was the vehicle fleet
ages at the activities to be studied. The researcher was
informed that a CASEMIS data base had records on the model
year of all Naval activities' vehicles. A sample of the
CASEMIS report is presented in Appendix B. It shows the
number of vehicles within in each Alpha code category sharing
a model year. The average age of Alpha codes "A" - "N" is
also given.
2. Vehicle Assignment
There are three assignment classes for Navy vehicles.
A vehicle with an "A" assignment is assigned to an individual,
or a particular position. NAVFAC discourages classifying
vehicles this way. Typically the vehicle assigned to an
activity's Commanding Officer is the only vehicle with a class
"A" assignment. Class "B" assignments are vehicles assigned
to an organization. Class "C" assignments are vehicles that
are operated out of the activity's motor pool. These vehicles
are dispatched upon request and returned by the user when the
specific trip for which they were requested is completed. It
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is generally felt that vehicles assigned to the motor pool are
used more efficiently than those assigned to individuals or
organizations. A common comment made to the researcher by the
transportation directors at various activities was that it was
difficult to get organizations to bring their vehicles in for
servicing. Both of these factors imply that activities with
greater proportions of their vehicles assigned to the motor
pool may in the long run, due to less frequent major
breakdowns of these vehicles, spend less per vehicle per mile
driven than activities with predominantly Class "B" assigned
vehicles.
No centralized records of Naval activities' vehicle
assignments are maintained. This information was available
only from each activity. The researcher included a question
about vehicle assignments when interviewing the transportation
directors of each activity studied. The interview process is
discussed in Section D.
3. Number and wage grades of transportation employees
The researcher's initial inclination was to think that
activities with relatively senior personnel in their
transportation organizations would tend to have higher
relative costs. After further consideration it was recognized
that the superior experience and expertise of more senior
people could well make such organizations more cost
32
effective. Either way, this factor seemed to be relevant and
therefore worth examining.
The original list of interview questions generated by
the researcher included a question regarding the number and
wage grades of all transportation personnel. Subsequently,
though, the researcher was advised that inquiring about the
wage grades in the work force might be considered sensitive
information by the transportation directors [Ref. 19].
Accordingly, the original question was revised and only the
number of mechanics, administrative workers, and supervisors
was inquired about.
4. Preventative maintenance
Like seniority of personnel, it was not clear
precisely how an activity's level of attention to preventative
maintenance would affect its overall transportation costs in
any one year. Activities with younger fleets might be able to
neglect preventative maintenance without seeing an immediate
increase in breakdowns. Obviously such neglect cannot
continue for long without a corresponding increase in repair
costs. A question about each activity's level of attention to
preventative maintenance was posed to the transportation
directors in order to see if any pattern emerged related to
this factor.
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5. Cost of operating
Activities in areas with high costs of living should
tend to have higher fuel, labor, and material costs.
Logically this should translate into higher relative
transportation costs. To try to assess the area cost of
living for each activity, Consumer Price Index (CPI) figures
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics were examined.
Both an overall CPI figure and a CPI figure measuring just
regional differences in gasoline prices were obtained. These
figures, along with fuel and labor unit costs calculated from
the TCR's, were used to assign a cost of operating category of
"High", "Medium", or "Low" for each activity. A summary of
these cost of living figures, and the cost of operating
category assigned to each activity, is presented in
Appendix C.
D. GATHERING THE DATA
The most important information from each activity for this
study was the cost data contained on the TCR's. Absent cost
data, any other information was useless. Before making the
effort to gather the subsidiary data, the researcher felt it
was wise to confirm that a TCR was available on each activity
chosen to be studied. It was quickly discovered that these
reports were not always readily available.
The researcher forwarded the list of activities chosen by
the process described in Section A of this chapter to NAVFAC,
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requesting that a copy of each activity's TCR be provided.
The response from NAVFAC was that only approximately one half
of the activities on the researcher's list had submitted a TCR
for Fiscal Year (FY) '92. The researcher then chose
substitute activities, maintaining the goal of studying a
group of activities that represented a wide range of
functions, fleet sizes, and locales. The result of the second
request for TCR's, and of several subsequent requests, was
much the same as that of the first request. Of the activities
requested each time, typically only one half of them were
found to have submitted TCR's in FY '92.
After several rounds of this, it was determined that it
would no longer be possible to receive TCR's on activities
with the desired broad range of characteristics. It was
noted, however, that of the Naval Air Stations on the original
list of activities to be studied, over 80% had submitted a TCR
in FY '92. At that point the decision was made to focus the
study heavily on Naval Air Stations. The lack of availability
of TCR's also made it impossible to select activities to be
studied such that a significant number of "head to head"
comparisons that isolated various characteristics, as had been
planned, could be made.
Though this represented a reduction in the scope of the
study, it was felt that studying mainly Naval Air Stations
could still be quite meaningful. Naval Air Stations are one
of the more numerous types of activities in the Navy.
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Comparisons of several Naval Air Stations having differences
in some of the characteristics being investigated, it was
felt, could yield some strong implications about the
feasibility of using a sampling procedure to complete the
COBRA studies, both among Naval Air Stations and possibly
across a broader range of Naval Activities. Accordingly a few
more Naval Air Stations were chosen, such that a wide range of
fleet sizes and regions were represented by the list of Naval
Air Stations to be studied. Thus, the final list of activities
was generated. A number of other activities were also studied
to see if any clear differences might exist between Naval Air
Stations and other types of activities. Figure 2 presents the
final list of activities.
NAVFAC provided TCR's for each activity. The main data
gathering effort was in contacting and interviewing the
transportation director at each activity. Appendix D is a























Final List of Activities
Figure 2
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IV. PRESENTATION OF DATA
The data gathered for this study were compiled and
analyzed in several different formats in an attempt to
discover any trends that might exist in the transportation
costs of Naval Air Stations. The tables in this chapter, as
discussed in the following paragraphs, show the various
formats in which the data were compiled for analysis. The
text of this chapter states some of the general observations
made about the data in each of the ways in which it was
arranged. Chapter V will discuss in more detail the data
analysis process.
The reader will note that the data tables do not include
information on all the activities listed in the preceding
chapter. An explanation of that fact is in order at this
point.
The omitted activities are: Naval Station New York,
Construction Battalion Center Port Hueneme, Naval Weapons
Station Pt. Mugu, Naval Shipyard Long Beach, and Naval Weapons
Station Concord. After gathering data on these activities, it
was determined that, in each case, it was either impossible or
inappropriate for the purposes of this study to compare them
with the other activities being analyzed.
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The TCR's of New York and Port Hueneme contained obvious
errors. In discussions with the transportation directors at
these two activities, the researcher was unable to
satisfactorily resolve the discrepancies. Pt. Mugu and Long
Beach had obtained the majority of their vehicle maintenance
from commercial sources in FY '92. Since the purpose of this
study was to determine the comparability of the Navy's in-
house transportation costs, the costs at these two activities
were irrelevant for further analysis. Concord had received
maintenance on its vehicle fleet from PWC San Francisco in FY
'92. The researcher was informed that the cost information on
these vehicles was not compiled in separate categories for
each Alpha Code category. The cost information for Concord
was, then, deemed to be useless for the purposes of this
study.
In addition to explaining the omission of these
activities, it is necessary for the researcher to make some
special comments about NAS Brunswick. The mileage figures
reported on Brunswick's TCR were, in several categories, far
above what might be considered normal readings. The
transportation director at Brunswick acknowledged that the
mileage shown for Alpha codes I and J were wrong [Ref. 20].
The figures for Alpha codes A, G, and H , though, he felt were
reasonable. So high are the mileage figures shown for codes
I and J, though, that the overall cost per mile figures for
Brunswick's fleet are significantly weighted by these two
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categories. The researcher opted to include data on Brunswick
in the data tables. In the data analysis, however, the
researcher did not compare Brunswick's total unit cost or its
costs in categories I and J to other activities.
Omitting the activities mentioned above represented only
a minor limitation in the revised scope of this study. As
discussed in Chapter III, the lack of cost information on
activities other than Naval Air Stations had already shifted
the primary focus of this study to analyzing and comparing the
transportation costs at Naval Air Stations. Since none of the
activities completely omitted were Naval Air Stations, the
main thrust of the efforts reported on here was unaffected by
the exclusion of these other activities. Reducing the number
of non-Naval Air Station activities did, though, make it even
more unlikely that any "Navy-wide" conclusions could be drawn
as a result of this study. The data found useful for this
study are discussed in general in the following sections.
A. INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITY DATA BASES
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the data came from
a variety of reports and publications from, and telephone
interviews with, several different organizations. The
researcher compiled a substantial library of information on
each activity. The first logical step was deemed to be
designing a single table, to present in a condensed format all
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of the potentially relevant information on each activity.
Appendix E presents these data in the format developed.
The top line of each of these reports gives summary
information that is, with the exception of the total dollars
per mile figure, primarily demographic in nature. The
indication given for the extent to which each activity was on
schedule with preventative maintenance servicing during FY '92
(the "Doing PM's " column) is a general, not absolute,
indicator. The figures in the fuel cost per gallon and
average labor rate columns are calculated from the fuel
gallons, fuel dollars, labor hours, and labor dollars (wages
and fringes) values on each activity's TCR. These figures
were found to be reasonably consistent with the other cost of
living information collected (see Appendix C). The total
dollars per mile column is the total unit cost for all
administrative vehicles (Alpha codes A-N) at the activity as
calculated from the TCR information.
The body of each report presents, with the exception of
the average model year column, values calculated from the
information given in each activity's TCR. The average model
year information was received from CESO (see Appendix B). The
"DT/KMI" column, gives the number of downtime hours per
thousand miles driven within each Alpha code for the year.
Though useful for reference during the analysis process,
these tables contained too much information to be extremely
valuable, in and of themselves, in identifying any patterns
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present in the overall data. The researcher found it
necessary, then, to arrange different parts of the data to
allow side by side comparisons of various aspects of each
activity's data. The next section discusses some of the
tables developed in that regard.
B. GROUP DATA BASES
In developing the tables displaying cost data on each
activity's fleet by Alpha code, it was decided to include only
the categories of vehicles owned by almost all of the
activities. The categories omitted were not represented in
the fleets of several activities and represented only a small
proportion of the fleets studied.
Almost all activities owned vehicles from Alpha code
categories A (sedans), B (busses), E (station wagons), G
(cargo pickup trucks), H (utility trucks, larger pickup
trucks), I (vans), K (dump trucks, large vans), and M (tractor
trailers, stake trucks). Some activities also owned vehicles
from Alpha code categories D (intercity busses), F
(ambulances), J (specialty trucks, and N (very large trucks).
The vehicles in the latter categories, though, represent less
than 3% of the total vehicle fleets at the Naval Air Stations
studied, and most Naval Air Stations had no vehicles in these
categories. It was felt that including these more rare Alpha
codes in the category-by-category analyses could not have
contributed to any conclusions. Still, it was recognized that
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these Alpha codes may have incurred enough costs to influence
the analysis of more comprehensive unit cost figures.
Therefore, the costs for these categories were included when
calculating comprehensive "total cost per mile" figures at
each activity. The remainder of the paragraphs in this
section discuss the group data bases developed.
1. Cost per mile tables
Tables 1 through 3, respectively, show the FY '92
fuel, labor, and material (parts) costs per mile within each
Alpha code group at each activity. Table 4 shows the total
dollar per mile figure within each category at every activity.
A cursory comparison of the standard deviations and
averages within each category immediately shows that, in
general, the data are widely dispersed. Examination of each
value in each category in some cases shows that most of the
numbers are grouped in a fairly tight range but that two or
three outlying values skew the average and deviation. In
other cases no pattern is discernible. The other general
observations made about these tables is that fuel cost figures
are more consistent than the other cost inputs (material and
labor), the more heavily populated Alpha codes (G and H) have
a noticeably narrower range of values, and, overall, the non-
Naval Air Station activities seem to have tighter data
groupings.
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It was clear to the researcher that, given such
dispersal in the financial data, if any patterns existed they
must be tied to nonfinancial factors. The next set of tables
incorporated some of these factors in the analysis.
2. Financial and nonfinancial factor tables
Tables 5, 6, and 7 display total cost per mile within
each category at each activity in relation to each of the
following: average model year, downtime per vehicle, and miles
per vehicle. Intuitively, one would expect that corresponding
to increases in vehicle age and downtime would be increases in
cost per mile. Tables 5 and 6, however, do not consistently
fulfill that expectation. Conversely, Table 7, for the most
part, gives more predictable indications. It shows that cost
per mile tends to come down as average miles driven go up.
These data also have aberrations though. Further,
though the general indications seem consistent, the magnitudes
of the jumps and drops in costs within a category are often
inconsistent with the magnitude of the increases and decreases
in miles per vehicle.
No definitive conclusions were forthcoming from these
tables. The researcher then opted to obtain a more broad
financial profile of the activities and analyze this along
with some nonfinancial factors.
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3. Total cost per mile versus nonfinancial factors
Table 8 shows the total cost per mile of each
activity's fleet alongside some nonfinancial characteristics
of that activity. Somewhat surprisingly, the total costs per
mile are relatively tightly grouped. Given the dispersal in
the data within categories, the consistency in this more broad
measure is difficult to explain. As with the other data
presentations, no clear pattern related to any factor, or
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V. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
This chapter discusses in detail the data analysis
process. Described fully here are the findings of the
researcher with regard to the quality of the data collected
and the specifics about the comparisons made and analyses done
in the search for identifiable trends in Naval activity
transportation costs.
A. QUALITY OF THE DATA
The degree of confidence with which conclusions can be
drawn from any set of data is heavily influenced by the
researcher's assessment of the quality of the data. In a
study such as the one reported on by this thesis, where the
researcher collects rather than produces the data, an
evaluation of the data's quality can be particularly
difficult. For a number of reasons, the researcher for this
study is skeptical about the reliability of the data
collected.
1. Expert opinion
In explaining the planned research methodology for
this study to veterans of Naval transportation organizations,
the comment was frequently made to the researcher that good
cost data may be difficult to get [Ref. 15, 16, 17, 18].
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Indeed, when the researcher solicited the advice of the
Transportation Equipment Management Centers (TEMC's), the
regional Naval vehicle fleet managers, on what activities in
their regions consistently provide quality TCR's, only three
activities were cited [Ref. 20].
As the data gathering and analysis phases of this
study proceeded, the researcher discovered more evidence, both
testimonial and material, that supported the opinions of the
experts with regard to the quality of the average TCR. The
following paragraphs discuss this additional evidence.
2. Activity transportation director comments
In the interviews conducted with the activity
transportation directors, the researcher asked the directors
about their feelings regarding their activities' TCR's.
Though some directors endorsed the use of TCR's and were
satisfied with the quality of the data in their reports, many
acknowledged that the data in their activities' TCR's may have
been inaccurate. The primary concerns expressed that directly
related to the quality of the cost information involve the
number of people outside the transportation organization who
input cost data into the report and problems with the computer
systems (equipment and software) used to generate the TCR. In
the researcher's opinion, the lack of management endorsement
of the TCR implied by some of the other dissatisfactions
expressed about it, most notably regarding its lack of
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usefulness as a management tool, may also adversely affect the
reliability of the report. If some activities are submitting
a report just to fulfill a requirement, it is likely that they
expend little effort in checking the quality of the data.
3. Failure of activities to submit a TCR
As reported in Section D of Chapter III, the
researcher experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining
TCR's on the activities originally chosen to be studied.
Before the decision was made to focus more heavily on Naval
Air Stations than other activities, the researcher found that
TCR's had been submitted by only approximately one-half of the
activities for which they were requested. The apparent
widespread lack of attention to cost reporting requirements by
Naval transportation organizations could imply a general
absence of time, resources, or desire to accurately account
for transportation costs.
4. Apparent discrepancies in the TCR's examined
Almost every TCR examined for this study contained
some figures that looked very questionable. Certainly there
are valid explanations for some of these aberrations.
Section B of this chapter offers some possible explanations
for how some of the apparently abnormal figures could, in
fact, be accurate. The prevalence of seemingly aberrant
figures and the activities' general lack of awareness of and
frequent inability to explain them, though, lead the
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researcher to conclude that many of the figures that appear to
be wrong probably are.
The fuel section of a number of activities' TCR's
contained illogical data. Logically, the quotient obtained
when the total fuel dollars are divided by the gallons of fuel
consumed should be a reasonable figure for dollars per gallon
of fuel. Frequently this was not found to be the case. Some
of the fuel costs that result from making such calculations
from the TCR's are: NAS Lemoore - $1.36/gal, NAVSTA New York -
$0.42/gal, WPNSTA Charleston - $16.32/gal, NAS Jacksonville -
$0.72/gal, and NSWC Bethesda - $0.68. The directors who were
asked about or who volunteered information on the fuel section
of their activities' TCR's universally expressed their lack of
control over the amounts for gallons consumed and fuel dollars
in the TCR. In most cases this information is provided by the
activity's fuel farm to the activity's controller. The
controller takes this input, along with the labor dollar,
material dollar, mileage, downtime, and labor hour information
provided by the transportation director, and compiles the TCR.
In general, there appears to be no check on the accuracy of
the overall report before its submission to NAVFAC and the
Navy Comptroller.
Very frequently when the researcher contacted an
activity's transportation director to seek clarification on
information that appeared to be questionable, the director was
surprised to learn of the discrepancy. Rarely did the
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director have better data readily available. In one case it
took a series of phone calls over a two week period to obtain
more reasonable data for three Alpha code categories at a
particular activity. In two cases, as mentioned in Chapter
III, it was deemed to be unlikely that any data that could
reasonably be assumed to be reliable would be obtained. These
activities were excluded from further consideration.
This subsection is not intended _u question the
competence of Navy transportation directors. The scope of
this study did not allow any conclusions as to why
discrepancies in the TCR data sometimes go unnoticed or
uncorrected. Clearly, though, for some reasons, the TCR's
frequently are generated -- when they are generated -- with
something less than meticulous attention to detail.
5. Lack of consistency between activities
It would have been no surprise to find occasional
aberrant figures in different categories of vehicles.
Likewise, it would not have been unexpected to find a few
activities with costs significantly, and consistently, outside
of some "normal" range. The degree of dispersal in the data
of this study, though, is considered to be unusually high.
The lack of identifiable patterns in the fluctuations is
similarly inexplicable. This lack of consistency is more
completely discussed in the next section. For the purpose of
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this section it is sufficient to observe that the unusually
inconsistent data may simply reflect poor data quality.
In consideration of the discussion in this section the
reader may legitimately question why the researcher continued
to plan the study around an analysis of the TCR's. The answer
is threefold. First, the sponsor of this study, NAVFAC,
identified the area of research of this study as being the
most pressing item of interest to them related to COBRA [Ref.
19). Second, in spite of the questionable quality of the
data, the TCR was acknowledged to be the only source of the
type of data needed for the type of study desired [Ref. 16].
Third, it was not clear if the quality problems with the TCR
were so great as to completely preclude reaching any
meaningful conclusions. The data, then, were analyzed and
interpreted objectively. Nothing received was dismissed out
of hand unless the transportation director confirmed that
certain data was wrong. The data analysis and interpretation
process described in the following sections was conducted as
if the data were known to be accurate. The conclusions, as
presented in Chapter VI, of course, were made with full
consideration given to the strong likelihood that at least
some of the data were unreliable.
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B. THE DATA ANALYSES
As mentioned above, the only consistent characteristic of
the data was a lack of consistency. There was inconsistency
in the cost data in each category of vehicle and the
differences could not be explained by examining the related
nonfinancial characteristics. It was also found that the data
frequently gave counter-intuitive indications when they were
analyzed for the presence of any overall cost trends that
might be associated with the nonfinancial characteristics of
activities. The subsections below elaborate in turn on each
of these findings. The final subsection of this section
discusses the only features of the data that show any
consistency.
1. Inconsistencies in Alpha code categories
As mentioned in the general observations made about
the data-in Chapter IV, one of the first things noticed when
examining the cost data in Tables 1 - 4 is the somewhat wild
fluctuations in figures within Alpha code groupings. In
virtually every category of each of these reports there are
numbers differing by orders of magnitude. The smallest
standard deviation in any category on any one of these tables
is almost 17% of the mean. Such a small deviation is clearly
the exception in this group of data. Since the researcher did
not undertake to determine conclusively what degree of
deviation in the data should be expected, it cannot be stated
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here whether a 17% deviation in this type of data is
reasonable or not. It can be confidently stated though, that
a set of data with deviations that frequently approach, and in
some cases exceed, the mean is not a set of data from which
reliable conclusions may be derived.
2. Inability to explain data variations
The researcher did look for possible explanations for
the most aberrant figures shown in Table 4 by examining the
relevant nonfinancial characteristics of Tables 5 and 7. Some
of the findings from this process are discussed in the next
two paragraphs.
The unusually high costs for the Alpha code B vehicles
at NSWC Bethesda and NAS Corpus Christi could possibly be
explained by the fact that they own only one and two,
respectively, and that these vehicles are unusually old. The
only vehicle in this category at Bethesda and one of the two
at Corpus Christi, has a model year of 1979. Similarly the
extremely high unit cost of Alpha code M vehicles at NAWC
Warminster may be explainable by the fact that the average
model year of Warminster's six vehicles in this category is
1974. Conversely, the aberrantly low unit cost of Alpha code
B vehicles at NAS Meridian might be partially attributable to
the fact that it owns only two of these vehicles, one model
year 1987 and the other model year 1990. This is a category
where the average model year for all activities studied is
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1985 (see Table 5). It could also be speculated that the high
usage, as indicated by the miles per vehicle figures on Table
7, may account for the low unit costs in the categories noted
at each of the following activities: NAS Adak - Alpha codes B,
G, and H; NAS Brunswick - Alpha codes G, H, and I; NAS Oceana
- Alpha code E; WPNSTA Charleston - Alpha codes G, and I; and
NAS Lemoore - Alpha codes E, H, and M.
More credence could have been attributed to the
possible explanations tendered above if it were not for the
fact that the same type of analysis frequently failed to
explain other aberrant figures. No possible explanations were
apparent for the unusually high unit costs in the categories
noted at the following activities: NSWC Bethesda - Alpha code
A; WPNSTA Charleston - Alpha code B; NAS Corpus Christi -
Alpha code M; NAS Glenview Alpha codes A, and I; NAS South
Weymouth - Alpha code I; and NAS Meridian - Alpha code M.
Likewise, there was no obvious factor to explain the unusually
low unit costs in Subase New London's Alpha code A and E
vehicles or in NAS Adak's Alpha code A vehicles.
The number of unusual figures alone would have made it
difficult to explain with any certainty the causes of the
fluctuations. The absence of any pattern to the fluctuations
makes it virtually impossible to do so. The variations
identified in the two preceding paragraphs involve 11 of the
15 activities studied. This fact precludes the possibility of
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eliminating from the study activities with questionable
figures on their TCR.
3. Counter-intuitive indications of nonfinancial
characteristics relative to overall costs
The previous subsection examined nonfinancial factors
in relation to activity costs in each Alpha code category.
The wide dispersal in and unpredictable nature of the data
when broken down by category, convinced the researcher of the
need for evaluating more comprehensive cost measures. This
subsection discusses the search for any broader indicators
that might exist. Table 8 shows the unit cost of the entire
administrative vehicle fleet at each activity along with a
number of nonfinancial characteristics of that activity and
its vehicle fleet. Following is a discussion of the analyses
performed using the data in this table.
The cost of operating, attention to preventative
maintenance, and average fleet age both individually and as a
group, give conflicting signals with respect to overall unit
transportation costs. Among Naval Air Stations, some
activities evaluated in Appendix C as having low operating
cost characteristics (NAS Corpus Christi and NAS Oceana) have
a higher overall unit transportation cost than NAS South
Weymouth, which was designated as a high cost of operating
activity. Among the other activities studied, WPNSTA
Charleston (low cost of operating), Subase New London (medium
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cost of operating), and NSWC Dahlgren (high cost of operating)
show the same unit transportation cost. Similarly, the data
show that some activities that attend fairly closely to
preventative maintenance requirements (NSWC Bethesda, NAWC
Warminster, NAS Oceana, and NAS Glenview) have higher unit
costs than some that neglect preventative maintenance (Subase
New London, and NAS South Weymouth). Since data from only one
year were analyzed, this could possibly reflect a short term
cost savings gained by the activities not regularly performing
preventative maintenance. Generally speaking, though, one
would expect that activities that neglect preventative
maintenance would suffer more frequent, severe, and costly
vehicle breakdowns. Finally, some activities with older
fleets (Subase New London, NAS Lemoore, and NAS Adak) have
lower unit costs than other activities with newer vehicles
(NAWC Lakehurst, and NAS Meridian).
An argument could be made that each of the above are
counter-intuitive. The researcher recognized, though, that if
identifiable cost trends existed they may exist in relation to
combinations of characteristics rather than any one
characteristic. One possible combination of characteristics
that the researcher felt may be predictive of cost movements
was the set of characteristics discussed individually in the
preceding paragraph. Logically, one would think that an older
fleet at an activity with a high operating cost that tended to
neglect preventative maintenance would, in the long run, have
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a higher unit cost than an activity opposite in each of those
characteristics. No combination of activities, among those
included in this study, could be identified that contrasted so
starkly in each of these three characteristics. One might
have expected, though, by the line of logic stated above, that
the unit costs at Subase New London and NAS South Weymouth
should be noticeably higher than the unit costs at WPNSTA
Charleston and NAS Meridian respectively. This is because the
vehicle fleet ages and costs of operating at the former two
activities are relatively higher than at the latter two. Also
the former two, unlike the latter two, tend to neglect
preventative maintenance. Instead, the unit costs at these
activities were found to be very similar.
Another set of characteristics tested individually and
in combination was average miles per vehicle, number of
mechanics, and number of vehicles. The only definitive
conclusion possible from these analyses was that the
activities with extremely high averages in the miles per
vehicle category (NAS Brunswick, NAS Adak, and NAS Lemoore)
also showed the lowest overall unit costs. Testing for the
same trend among activities with average miles per vehicle
figures closer to the median produced mixed results. Some
activities with low mileage per vehicle (NAS Corpus Christi
and NAS Jacksonville, for example) have lower unit costs than
some activities with higher miles per vehicle (NSWC Bethesda,
NAS Oceana, and NAS Glenview).
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The homogeneity among Naval Air Stations in the
vehicle assignment characteristic rendered it effectively
irrelevant for the purposes of this study. Though there
exists some diversity in this characteristic among the other
activities studied, such a small basis for comparison cannot
lead to any meaningful conclusions.
4. The only consistent features of the data
In stark contrast to the general wide dispersal in the
data were the unit costs for Alpha codes E, G, and H and for
the overall fleets. One possible explanation for the
relatively narrow range of unit costs within Alpha codes G and
H is that these are the two categories that represent the bulk
of the vehicle fleets at most activities. The vehicles in
these two categories are predominantly pickup trucks, and they
comprise over 60% of the vehicles owned by the activities
studied. Since most activities own a relatively large number
of vehicles in these categories, it would be quite reasonable
that the costs to activities in these categories should be
more stable. In categories with only a few vehicles, one or
two substandard vehicles could easily inflate the overall
costs within those categories. Categories with larger numbers
of vehicles are insulated somewhat against such distortions.
This explanation, though, doesn't hold with respect to Alpha
code E vehicles (predominantly station wagons). This category
generally contains less than 5% of an activity's fleet.
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It is more difficult to offer a plausible explanation
for the relatively stable unit costs of the overall fleets.
It might be thought that the relative stability in Alpha codes
G and H weight the overall unit cost so heavily that the tight
grouping of the overall costs is understandable. This doesn't
follow though. For, while Alpha codes G and H contain over
60% of the vehicles studied, they represent only approximately
50% of the total costs. It is not logical that this set of
data, which shows significant dispersal in vehicle categories
that represent half of the transportation costs at the
activities studied, should produce such a tight grouping in
the overall figures. The researcher can only conclude that
the more consistent overall figures are more coincidental than
meaningful.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMNENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. Absence of patterns in Navy transportation costs
It is quite evident that the data collected and
analyzed for this study provide no basis for identifying
trends in Navy passenger vehicle costs. Three characteristics
of the data were the primary factors in leading the researcher
to this conclusion. These are the questionable quality of the
data, the wide dispersal in the data, and the lack of any
discernible patterns in the dispersal of the data.
a. Questionable data quality
Even had the data collected been extremely
consistent, it would have been tenuous to confidently draw
from it any definitive conclusions. The comments made to the
researcher about the quality of the data before they were
collected and the researcher's own observations about the data
quality during the analysis process would have made the
researcher very cautious about ascribing much significance to
any trends. When the prevailing attitude in the Navy
transportation world is that the cost reporting is marginal,
at best, and the cost reports, when available, are often found
to be mistake-ridden, a healthy level of skepticism about the
implications of a collection of these reports seems
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7appropriate. This is one reason the researcher is inclined
to dismiss as coincidence the relatively higher degree of
consistency found in the cost per mile figures of the overall
fleets and in Alpha codes E, G and H. Another reason for
doubting the significance of the apparent consistency in the
overall fleet cost figures is discussed in the next paragraph.
b. Wide dispersal in data
When presented with a set of data with such extreme
fluctuations as the set analyzed for this study, data
interpretation becomes quite a challenging process. If the
starting assumption in analyzing a set of data is that the set
accurately reflects reality, such fluctuations would seem to
imply that the data are very sensitive to whatever factors
affect them. In the case of this study, it is not clear to
the researcher why Navy transportation costs should be as
sensitive to any factor or combination of factors as the data
collected would imply that they are. It was difficult then to
infer meaning from a set of data that seemed so illogically
sensitive.
This difficulty also applies with regard to the
apparent consistency in the overall fleet unit costs. It
doesn't make sense to the researcher that such a generally
chaotic set of data can produce a meaningful summary measure.
Were this phenomenon to be observed over a period of years,
perhaps it could be, though inexplicable, somehow meaningful.
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The only thing, however, that would have lent meaning to the
widely dispersed set of data collected for this study would
have been some identifiable pattern in the dispersal. The
next paragraph discusses the absence of any such pattern.
c. Absence of any pattern in the data dispersal
Were some widely dispersed data found to move
consistently with the movements of some influencing factor(s),
their dispersal would, perhaps, be not at all troubling. As
discussed at length in Chapter V, such is not the case with
the data analyzed for this study. No factor, or set of
factors, was found to have a predictable effect on the cost
data. Even for the data that seemed to be consistent (total
fleet unit costs, and Alpha codes E, G, and H unit costs)
nothing could be identified that explained the cost movements.
The absence of any pattern in the data dispersal clearly
supports the feeling that the data are of generally poor
quality. Unfortunately, such a conclusion casts doubt on the
possibility of successfully using data like those gathered for
this study to identify and explain trends in Navy
transportation costs. A related conclusion of the researcher
is that, even with good data, it may have been quite difficult
to identify a set of characteristics that consistently explain
the differences in transportation costs between activities.
This conclusion is discussed next.
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2. Inherent difficulty in identifying transportation cost
patterns
Naval activities are not a homogeneous lot. This
study attempted to account for their regional and functional
diversities. Consideration was also given to differences in
the size of the activities, the size of their transportation
work force, the age of their vehicle fleet, vehicle usage
levels, and their attention to preventative maintenance. Even
with this limited number of activity and fleet characteristics
to consider, it was difficult to evaluate the cost figures
with respect to all possible combinations of these
characteristics. In the data analysis process some other
activity characteristics with potential transportation cost
ramifications were mentioned to, or discovered by, the
researcher. These are discussed below.
One factor mentioned to the researcher as a possible
cost-affecting characteristic is the number of customers
served by a transportation office [Ref. 22]. This is
especially true if a number of off-site customers are served.
Serving a wide customer base increases administrative costs
and makes it more difficult to keep vehicles properly
serviced. It also occurred to the researcher that the extent
to which a transportation organization works on a reimbursable
basis might affect their costs. It seems logical that, if
organizations are required to pay for the services of
vehicles, they will be more conscientious users of them. This
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would imply that activitiev operating from a revolving fund,
where all services are provided at cost, may have lower unit
transportation costs. Other possible cost factors include the
priorities of the activity commander and the availability of
qualified labor.
The conclusion of the researcher relative to the above
discussion is that, given the large number of factors that may
affect the transportation costs of an activity, it would be
very difficult to identify a set of characteristics that would
consistently explain the differences between activities'
transportation costs. Thus, it would also be difficult to
categorize a larger group of Naval activities according to
their transportation costs, even it the cost data were
considered reliable.
3. Need for improvement in cost reporting system
In this day of budget austerity, a premium has been
put on operational efficiency and effectiveness. It is not
enough just to cut costs; the right costs must be cut if
efficiency and effectiveness are to be improved. Identifying
the areas of excess spending can be difficult, even with good
cost accounting and reporting systems in place. Trying to do
so without good cost information will be like "shooting in the
dark". The competitive environment that the requirements of
Chapter 20 of COBRA place Navy transportation organizations in
makes it even more important that they be able to accurately
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assess their cost of doing business. Clearly, the system, or
people for doing this are, in general, not currently in place.
Failure to address this deficiency could make Navy
transportation organizations less competitive with GSA and the
commercial sector. Certainly, it will hurt their ability to
operate efficiently and effectively.
4. Managerial and administrative costs should be
considered to determine similarity between activities
As mentioned earlier the researcher initially made the
assumption that the costs of managing and providing
administrative support for transportation organizations would
be so similar between activities that they could safely be
ignored for the purposes of this study. The researcher later
decided that it was incorrect to declare these costs
irrelevant without seeking to determine what characteristics
of activities they are related to. It is easily imaginable
that large activities may realize some economies of scale in
their managerial and administrative transportation costs that
are not achievable at smaller activities. These economies of
scale might make the larger activities' overall costs more
competitive with those of GSA and the commercial sector. This
could be true even if the direct unit costs of a large and a
small activity were very similar.
The researcher did not come to this conclusion until
after it had become obvious that the data collected were too
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unreliable to allow any conclusions about transportation cost
similarities between activities. Studying data on managerial
and administrative costs at that point could not have lead to
any conclusions relevant to this study.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Continue to investigate the feasibility of sampling
The data in this study do not justify using sampling
to complete the COBRA studies. This does not mean that
sampling is impossible. The researcher's conclusion is only
that sampling categories cannot be established based on an
analysis of activities' cost reports. Considering the time
and cost savings that would likely result from using a
sampling technique for the COBRA studies, the researcher's
opinion is that it is too early to give up on this
alternative.
The first activities to be competed against GSA and
the commercial sector under COBRA should be chosen so that the
results of the studies may shed light on the feasibility of
using sampling. If the in-depth cost analyses and bidding
process at these activities imply that some activities can be
grouped based on the similarity of their transportation costs,
consideration should be given to completing the remainder of
the cost studies in these by groups using sampling.
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2. Improve transportation cost reporting systems
Three primary problems in the Navy transportation cost
reporting system were identified in the course of this study.
They are untrained personnel, problems with computer and
software systems, and inability of the transportation
organization to control the input into the TCR's.
In a number of cases neither the transportation
director, nor anyone else the researcher spoke with at an
activity, appeared to completely understand the reporting
format of the TCR. There seemed to be not only a lack of
awareness of what was in the TCR, but also a lack of awareness
of what was supposed to be in it. Obviously, the cost
reporting system cannot be expected to improve until the
people responsible for preparing the reports ?.-0-.sand the
format.
Several comments were made to the researcher by
activity transportation personnel about computer and software
problems making the job of producing good cost data even
harder. It also appears that various software systems are
used to produce the TCR's. Computer upgrades and standardized
software might improve the product of the cost reporting
system.
The fact that people outside the transportation
organization provide information to the controller for
inclusion in the TCR without the information first being
screened for obvious discrepancies by anyone in the
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transportation organization likely accounts for some of the
quality problems. The researcher recommends that all
information submitted for inclusion in a TCR be routed through
the transportation organization for verification.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Some further questions suggested by this study are as
follows:
1. What can be done to improve the Navy's transportation
cost reporting system?
2. If cost data are reliable, are Navy transportation
organizations competitive with GSA and the private
sector?
3. What adjustments to the bids of the in-house
transportation organization, GSA, and any commercial
bidders would be necessary to insure that the bids are
evaluated on an equal footing? This would include, in
part, studying what costs of ownership should be
included in the in-house bid to make it comparable with
other bids received and identifying and quanitfying
additional costs to the Navy that would be generated
were transportation services to be provided by GSA or a
contractor.
4. What are the procurement and disposal costs that should
be included when developing the in-house cost estimate?
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APPENDIX A. ORIGINAL SPREADSHEET
EXPLANATION OF COLUMN HEADINGS
* Claimant UIC - The unit identification code of the major
claimant for each activity.
* Total 01-04 - The total number of vehicles in codes 01
through 04 (administrative vehicles).
* 01, 02, 03, and 04 quantity - The number of vehicles in
each category.
* 01, 02, 03, and 04/TOT - The percentage of the total each
code represents.
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ACTIVITY NAW CLAIWT TOTAL Of 02 03 04 01TOT /T1T 03/TOT 04/TOT
UIC 01-04 QTY QTY ITY QTY
19 098
NAVWNWAUE)IV KE`WOU WA 24 348 12 30 171 135 0.03 0.09 0.49 0.39
NAIVAIDRVMMIV UAKEIST NJ 19 221 29 41 134 17 0.13 0.19 0.61 0.08
NiVAIHINRSM IV INDIANAPOLIS 19 29 2 3 18 6 0.07 0.10 0.62 0.21
"AII 15EAU 3IV MEIPORT RI 24 74 2 9 48 15 0.03 0.12 0.65 0.20
*N IA I R DEcIV R 24 115 15 15 71 14 0.13 0.13 0.62 0.12
0MVWIJICMN COASTSYSTA FL 24 130 8 11 88 23 0.06 0.08 0.68 0.18
IMSFWIEIV DAHLGREN VA 24 488 115 83 262 28 0.24 0.17 0.54 0.06
NAVAIRUBMW IV 3IlTE SAM) 24 80 5 9 52 14 0.06 0.11 0.65 0.18
NAV3IWIARIND)IV INDIAN HEAD 24 397 26 76 251 44 0.01 0.19 0.63 0.11
NAVAIRWIABNAC)IV PATU1XEIT HI) 19 368 23 56 245 44 0.06 0.15 0.67 0.12
NAVAlIIARCENACDIV CHINk LAKE 19 992 27 67 854 11 0.03 0.07 0.86 0.01
NMVAIRtWENAIV VAMINSTER 19 77 8 9 48 12 0.10 0.12 0.62 0.16
*VAIlW3CENACIV TRENION NJ 19 35 2 6 23 4 0.06 0.17 0.66 0.11
HEAN 258 21 32 174 28 0 0 1 0
STAMM DEVIATION 259 29 28 214 33 0 0 0 0
WiVSTA PUGmT s 70 93 14 7 71 1 0.15 0.08 0.76 0.01
NkVSTA NAYPORT FL 60 430 65 52 291 22 0.15 0.12 0.68 0.05
kSA RVELT OADS• • 60 517 66 59 341 51 0.13 0.11 0.66 0.10
NIVSTA INE• Y NY 60 201 36 24 122 19 0.18 0.12 0.61 0.09
*VSTA INGLESIDE TX 60 173 30 21 107 15 0.17 0.12 0.62 0.09
JEAN 283 42 33 16 22 0 0 1 0
STANDARD DEVIATION 162 20 20 108 16 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03
29C 094
NA* DET OEL79M 1R1 63 18 6 2 10 0 0.33 0.11 0.56 0.00
IMVOMI"A S'iOCTON CA 63 48 2 5 38 3 0.04 0.10 0.79 0.06
NAVCOIIIT HIAETM E 63 12 0 6 4 2 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.17
NkiITLSTA ROSEVELT $S PR 63 19 1 1 17 0 0.06 0.06 0.94 0.00
IVfT •LSTA CUM FE 63 47 2 8 34 3 0.04 0.17 0.72 0.06
iNVQNTELSTA DET ALBANY GA 63 2 1 0 1 0 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00
NAV~IlfTELSTA K IW MU 63 27 1 7 17 2 0.04 0.26 0.63 0.07
NiCfQllELSTA JAMONVILLE Fl 63 18 4 1 13 0 0.22 0.06 0.72 0.00
NAVRADSTA SUGAR OVE 63 40 4 5 31 0 0.10 0.13 0.78 0.00
rEAN 26 2 4 18 1 0.15 0.15 0.66 0.04
STANDAD DEVIATION 15 2 3 12 1 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.05
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ACTIVIIY WE CLAIMANT 1OTAL 01 02 03 04 01/0TO 02/TOT 03/0TO 04fmTO
UIC 01-04 QTY QTY QTY QTY
OC 093
UAWEDCLINIC PORTSIOUTH MNI 18 18 0 14 4 0 0.00 0.78 0.22 0.60
NIkWEDLINIC AISAPOLIS RI) 18 5 0 5 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
VMEDa)CLICIC QALWTIC VA 18 4 0 4 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
NAVIMEDCLINIC KEY lEST FL 18 3 0 3 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
I111EDCLINIC EATTL WA 18 2 0 2 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
NAVNEDCLINIC PTI IEIE CA 18 9 0 9 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
IIAUEDCLINIC 0 ORLEANS U 18 4 0 4 0 0 0.00. 1.00 0.00 0.00
AMViEDCINIC PEARL HAWDR HI 18 15 0 15 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
NRWEDCLINIC PHILADELPHIA PA 18 37 7 14 16 0 0.19 0.38 0.43 0.00
REA 10.78 0.78 7.78 2.22 0.00 0.02 0.91 0.07 0.00
STAMM DEVIATION 10.66 2.20 4.98 5.03 0.00 0.06 0.20 0.14 0.00
NAIIP P0TMOM VA 18 85 11 36 38 0 0.13 0.42 0.45 0.00
lhVS)lSP W MT RTADS PR 18 9 0 9 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
momIQGm 18 25 0 25 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
MOM PESACOLA FL 18 32 0 32 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
VSAT LAKES IL 18 12 0 12 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
NiWJSP JACKMIU. Fl 18 27 0 27 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
*UI) SAN DIEGO CA 18 37 2 35 0 0 0.05 0.95 0.00 0.00
SP CF5 CHRISTI TX 18 15 0 15 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
iISP OAKCLAND CA 18 26 0 26 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
AIHO•S1 WNTYNIlE PAIJM CA 18 16 0 7 9 0 0.00 0.44 0.56 0.00
1•MVOS13ILLINRV N1 18 7 0 7 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
NAVIH PDEAUFORT 18 34 5 15 14 0 0.15 0.44 0.41 0.00
NAVHSP am CT t1 5 0 5 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
*WS ORLAND FL 18 8 0 8 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
NAUI HUYPTNC 18 12 1 6 5 0 0.08 0.50 0.42 0.00
Nk VOSP IBM CA 18 5 0 5 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
NAVHOSP OAK HAR WA 18 5 0 5 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
NAVIHSP PAUXENT RIVER N 18 6 0 6 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
NAVIOSP CHARLESTO SC 18 10 0 10 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
*VHSP EWORI 18 10 0 10 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
* 3SLONG EACHCA 18 11 0 11 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Nk S CAMP LEJE NC 18 52 4 15 33 0 0.06 0.29 0.63 0.00
IAVHIS CAMP PEN)LETON CA 18 97 9 35 53 0 0.09 0.36 0.55 0.00
*WI33D3 •ERT0NA 18 11 0 11 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
lEAN 23.21 1.33 15.54 6.33 0.00 0.02 0.85 0.13 0.00
STAMM DEVIATION 23.72 2.92 10.52 13.97 0.00 0.04 0.26 0.22 0.00
81
ACTIVITY NUE CLAIMANT TOTAL 01 02 03 04 O1/lOT O2f/l3T 03/TOT 04/TOT
UIC 01-04 QTY 'Y UlY QTY
i5C04
m YPaISIM T[ WI 24 211 21 61 81 48 0.10 0.29 0.38 0.23
NSY LIOG EACH CA 24 707 91 91 453 72 0.13 0.13 0.64 0.10
NSY PHILADELPHIA PA 24 709 101 89 324 195 0.14 0.13 0.46 0.28
NSY NDWOLK VA 24 632 28 172 329 103 0.04 0.27 0.52 0.16
NSY PtJUET SOUD EIMRTON WA 24 427 3 63 257 104 0.01 0.15 0.60 0.24
NKY CHARLESTON SC 24 616 74 103 379 60 0.12 0.17 0.62 0.10
NSY M ISLAND VALLEJO CA 24 628 30 46 412 140 0.05 0.11 0.28 0.11
OMlN 561.43 49.71 89.29 319.29 103.14 0.05 0.18 0.50 0.17
STANDARD DEVIATION 167.43 35.30 43.48 52.86 45.10 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.07
NSC NORFOLK VA 23 61 0 14 38 9 0.00 0.23 0.62 0.15
NSC PUET SOUND EIRTN U WA 23 54 0 11 33 10 0.00 0.20 0.61 0.19
NSC CHEATHAII MiX WILLIAMISG VA 23 68 0 15 43 10 0.00 0.22 0.63 0.15
NSC JACIQ(S ILLE FL 23 33 0 11 10 12 0.00 0.33 0.30 0.36
MEAN 54.00 0.00 12.75 31.00 10.25 0.00 0.25 0.54 0.21
STANDARD DEVIATION 13.10 0.00 1.79 12.63 1.09 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.09
NMM VFAC(NGMIM PHIL PA 25 132 13 0 119 0 0.10 0.00 0.90 0.00
,EST1AVFAtNM;(• SAN BOW CA 25 288 2 0 286 0 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.00
CGIAVFAIGCN UX W DC 25 71 2 1 68 0.03 0.01 0.96 0.00
SOTIJIAVFACGM CHARLESTN SC 25 198 3 1 193 1 0.02 0.01 0.97 0.01
REAN 172.25 5.00 0.50 166.50 0.33 0.04 0.00 0.96 0.00
STANDARD DEVIATION 80.52 4.64 0.50 82.07 0.47 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00
9FSIHIP CARLESMN SC 24 33 8 1 24 0 0.24 0.03 0.73 0.00
1JSU IP PORTSIMUTH VA 24 27 15 1 11 0 0.56 0.04 0.41 0.00
SUPSHIP BATH fIE 24 9 5 0 4 0 0.56 0.00 0.44 0.00
SUPSHIP IE RT WE! VA 24 6 5 0 1 0 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00
lEAN 18.75 8.25 0.50 10.00 0.00 0.55 0.02 0.44 0.00
STAND)IA) DEVIATION 11 4 1 9 0 0.21 0.02 0.20 0.00
W9STA YOTO VA 24 413 26 67 237 83 0.06 0.16 0.57 0.20
WMTA CIARLESTON SC 24 1096 20 122 535 419 0.02 0.11 0.49 0.38
WNSTA GONLO) CA 24 318 21 41 174 82 0.07 0.13 0.55 0.26
WNSTA SEAL BEAOi CA 24 391 12 86 214 79 0.03 0.22 0.55 0.20
WISTA EARLE COLTS NECK NJ 24 286 23 69 110 84 0.06 0.24 0.38 0.29
NAVAIRWNSTA PT II0 CA 19 603 47 80 389 87 0.06 0.13 0.65 0.14
MEAN 517.83 24.83 77.50 276.50 139.00 0.06 0.17 0.53 0.25
STANDARD) DEVIATION 277.57 10.79 24.40 143.28 125.24 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05
(CB DAVISVILLE RI 25 30 4 5 19 2 0.13 0.17 0.63 0.07
C PT IEIE CA 25 353 33 49 214 60 0.09 0.13 0.61 0.17
CC GLFPORT 25 154 25 25 89 15 0.16 0.16 0.58 0.10
JMAN 179.00 20.67 25.33 107.33 25.67 0.13 0.15 0.61 0.11
STANDARD DEVIATION 133.04 12.23 16.74 80.66 24.85 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04
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ACTIVITY AME CLAIMANT TOTAL 01 02 03 04 0I/TOT 021/rT 03/TOT 04/TOT
ulc 01-O04 UY QTY QlY QTY
NAS SOUTH EYMIIUI HA 72 83 4 9 63 7 0.05 0.11 0.76 0.08
NAS IILLOW GROVE PA 72 112 6 14 69 3 0.05 0.13 0.79 0.03
AFU SINGTON HDC 72 68 4 4 58 2 0.06 0.06 0.65 0.03
Nis ATLANTA Q 72 57 2 7 47 1 0.04 0.12 0.82 0.02
NAS NEW ORLEANS 72 77 6 9 59 3 0.06 0.12 0.77 0.04
NAS DALLAS TX 72 102 6 9 85 2 0.06 0.09 0.83 0.02
HAF DETRO0IT 72 46 4 5 35 2 0.09 0.11 0.76 0.04
NAS GLENVIEV IL 72 88 9 9 64 6 0.10 0.10 0.73 0.07
MAN 79.13 5.13 8.25 62.50 3.25 0.07 0.10 0.79 0.04
STMI)AND DEVIATION 20.65 1.96 2.66 16.73 1.98 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02
NAS NOLK VA 60 0 ER ERR ERR ERR
MHS JAQCSONVILLE FL 60 461 41 73 303 64 0.09 0.15 0.63 0.13
MAS KEY ST 60 412 42 54 297 19 0.10 0.13 0.72 0.05
HAS 3B,5IICI HE 60 216 17 26 158 15 0.06 0.12 0.73 0.07
UAS OEANA VA 60 364 22 58 248 36 0.06 0.16 0.68 0.10
HAS CECIL FIELD FL 60 337 19 57 216 43 0.06 0.17 0.65 0.13
MAN 362.00 28.20 53.60 244.80 35.40 0.08 0.15 0.68 0.10
STAMMAD DEVIATION 87.87 10.98 15.29 53.62 17.67 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03
MlS PEM3MLA FL 62 0 ERR ERR ERR ERR
NAS CORPS CIRISTI TX 62 254 25 20 200 9 0.10 0.06 0.79 0.04
HAUS mEFIS 1N 62 275 30 37 204 4 0.11 0.13 0.74 0.01
HAS KINGSVILLE TX 62 161 16 19 117 9 0.10 0.12 0.73 0.06
hS CAME FIELD TX 62 134 14 15 98 7 0.10 0.11 0.73 0.05
NkS WIITING FLD MILTON FL 62 113 11 11 78 13 0.10 0.10 0.69 0.12
HAS MERIDIAN HS 62 155 12 15 115 13 0.06 0.10 0.74 0.08
MEAN 182.00 18.00 19.50 135.33 9.17 0.10 0.11 0.74 0.06
STAN)AR) DEVIATION 60.65 1.05 8.36 48.87 3.18 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
NkS ALAIEDA 70 0 Em ERR ERR E
kS HOFFETF FIELD CA 70 231 22 28 171 10 0.10 0.12 0.74 0.04
F EL CENTRO CA 70 88 7 4 75 2 0.08 0.05 0.85 0.02
NRS ADAK AK 70 249 25 41 165 18 0.10 0.16 0.66 0.07
NAS FALLON NV 70 211 22 14 166 9 0.10 0.07 0.19 0.04
NkS LEM CA 70 351 29 49 243 30 0.08 0.14 0.69 0.09
AS 34IDBEY ISLAM) WA 70 290 18 19 250 3 0.06 0.07 0.86 0.01
MEAN 236.67 20.50 25.83 178.33 12.00 0.09 0.10 0.77 0.05
STANDAR) DEVIATION 80.48 6.90 15.46 58.28 9.61 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.03
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ACTIV1Y NIAME CLAIPNT TOTAL 01 02 03 04 01/TOT 02/TOT 03/TOT 04/TOT
UIC 01-04 QTY QTY QTY QTY
19SC 091
NAVIVEV NEMG NERT RI It 17 11 0 6 0 0.65 0.00 0.35 0.00
NhVINVl R NIDLAKHEG NORFLK 11 55 51 0 4 0 0.93 0.00 0.07 0.00
AVIVMRV G SAN DIEG CA 11 29 26 0 3 0 0.90 0.00 0.10 0.00
IMVINRV G SAN FRANCSIC 11 7 2 0 5 0 0.29 0.00 0.71 0.00
RViNW ill RIDPAC P MW 11H 11 8 6 0 2 0 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00
mm 23.20 19.20 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.30 0.00
STANDA DEVIATION 17.76 17.86 0.00 1.41 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.23 0.00
SVRESE EG SIX WS DC 72 24 1 1 22 0 0.04 0.04 0.92 0.00
MN E G 10 N ORLEANS 72 47 3 2 42 0 0.06 0.04 0.89 0.00
NiVE EG 207SAWRANCA 12 25 2 0 23 0 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00
N S G 22 •ATTLE A 72 40 1 1 38 0 0.03 0.03 0.95 0.00
URS ME G 5 RAVE NA ON 72 31 1 1 29 0 0.03 0.03 0.94 0.00
i SED MG 13 AKES IL 72 27 1 1 25 0 0.04 0.04 0.93 0.00
i 9 BEG 4 FHLA PA 72 28 2 1 25 0 0.07 0.04 0.89 0.00
VIMI M IIEG 16 OLATE KS 72 29 2 0 27 0 0.07 0.00 0.93 0.00
NAVESE RE 9 M IS T 72 24 1 0 23 0 0.04 0.00 0.96 0.00
*VEM I REG 16 fIl m 72 26 1 0 25 0 0.04 0.00 0.96 0.00
IUES I EG 19 S DIEM CA 72 31 2 1 28 0 0.06 0.03 0.90 0.00
VEý IEG I EWRT RI 72 24 1 2 21 0 0.04 0.06 0.88 0.00
11 0 7 MSNSC 72 22 1 0 21 0 0.05 0.00 0.95 0.00
V REG 2 SCOTIA NY 72" 3 4 1 31 0 0.11 0.03 0.86 0.00
VRE MG 8 JAX FL 72 26 2 2 22 0 0.08 0.08 0.65 0.00
NkE B1 I DALLASTX 72 20 1 0 19 0 0.05 0.00 0.95 0.00
MAN 28.75 1.63 0.81 26.31 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.92 0.00
STMID DEVIATION 6.82 0.86 0.73 6.07 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.00
C 092
*VCM = VINTER Hi A It 69 41 5 5 28 3 0.12 0.12 0.68 0.07
VEOI ACT SABANA SMCPR 69 47 3 6 34 4 0.06 0.13 0.72 0.09
RVSiEMc EOQIAR1 2M SC 69 17 1 1 12 3 0.06 0.06 0.71 0.18
NRVSEMC TIEMEAD F. 69 19 4 0 15 0 0.21 0.00 0.79 0.00
NAVSEMCTFORT GI WM RD 69 5 3 0 2 0 0.60 0.00 0.40 0.00
NkVSECMACT ODAK AK 69 50 2 9 38 1 0.04 0.18 0.76 0.02
NAVSECTM ANCMAE 69 4 1 0 3 0 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00
MAN 26.14 2.71 3.00 18.86 1.57 0.19 0.07 0.69 0.05
SANI DEVIATION 18.11 1.39 3.38 13.51 1.59 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.06
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APPENDIX B. INFORMATION IN CASEXIS REPORT




















APPENDIX C. COST OF OPERATING INFORPATION
CMST OF OPERATING INFORATION
FUEL S'S PER GALLON LABOR : OVERALL MCST OF
S CPI TI WAGE RVEY TCR CPI : OPERATING
NSIC DAHL.GEN 0.91 20.62 HIGH
NSUC BETHESDA 1.185 ? 14.80 26.96 145.1 MED
SIEBASE NEW LONDON 1.24 0.80 16.78 149.2 ED
IE"TA COiARLESTON 1.092 0.81 13.70 19.55 136.9 LOW
UK UAIAINSTER 1.19 0.80 16.22 21.00 147.6 HIGH
NAIC LAKEHJRST 1.19 0.84 16.22 17.14 147.6 HIGH
NAS COUS CHRISTI 1.085 0.83 11.50 17.27 LOW
NAS BIRIJI.R81 1.152 0.81 17.77 147.1 IEDIUM
NAS OCEANA 1.117 0.83 13.06 17.82 136.9 Low
NHS GLENVIEW 1.205 0.74 16.09 21.34 138.2 HIGi
NAS LENJORE 1.223 1.13 12.03 ? 141.6 NED
NAS SOUTH ZYM 1.18 0.81 15.96 18.74 149.8 HIGI
HAS JAX 1.111 0.83 18.47 136.9 LOW
HAS ADAK
HAS IERIDIAN 1.09 11.60 20.13 136.9 ED
I FUEL DOLLARS PER GALLON P1 = THE CQ3IMERS PRICE INDEX FOR TIE AREA OF THE ACTIVITY
DIRING CALENDAR YEAR 1992 AS REPORTED BY THE BUIEAU OF LABOR STATI3TICS.
I FUEL DOLLARS PER GALLON TCR = THE PRICE OF GASOLINE IN DOLLARS PER GALLON FOR AN ACTIVITY
AS CALCULATED FROM THEIR TRANSPORTATION COST REPORT.
i LABOR WAGE SEIVEY = THE AVERAGE WAGE PAID TO A CIVILIAN AUTO ECHANIC IN TIE AREA OF TIE
ACTIVITY AS REPORTED BY TIE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S WAGE SURVEY DEPARTMENT.
* LABOR TCR = THE AVERAGE WAGE RATE, INCLUDING FRINGES, PAID TO THE AUTO MECHANICS AT AN
ACTIVITY AS CAL.CLATED FROM THEIR TRAWFORTATION MST REPORT.
I OVERALL CPI = TE OVERALL CONSUMERS PRICE INDEX IN TIE AREA OF TIE ACTIVITY AS REPTED
BY TIE BM•RAU OF LABOR STATISTICS.
M COST OF OPERATING: THE RELATIVE CATEGORY DETERMINED FOR TIE ACTIVITY FROM THE ABOVE DATA.
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APPENDIX D. LIST OF INTERVIEWS
1. Mr. George Borucki, NAS Glenview, IL, 23 March 93.
2. Mr. Tony Mcdowell, NAS Lemoore, CA, 18 March 93.
3. Mr. Ed Linke, NAWC Warminster, MA, 22 March 93.
4. Mr. Craig Holly, Naval Subase New London, CT, 22
March 93.
5. Mr. Nick-Torres, Naval Station New York, NY, 18
March 93.
6. Mr. Paul Hansen, Naval Weapons Station Charleston,
SC, 19 March 93.
7. Mr. Eddie Ochoa, NAS Corpus Christi, TX, 22 March 93.
8. Mr. Ed Dempsey, NAS Meridian, MS, 16 March 93.
9. Mr. Ray Murden, NAS Oceana, VA, 18 March 93.
10. Mr. John Tilton, NAWC Lakehurst, NJ, 22 March 93.
11. EOCS Salois, NAS Adak, AK, 27 March 93.
12. Mr. Jimmy Moten, Naval Weapons Station Concord, CA,
18 March 93.
13. Mr. Rick Hote, NAS South Weymouth, MA, 23 March 93.
14. Mr. Chuck Wilson, NAS Jacksonville, FL, 23 March 93.
15. Mr. Tom Smith, NAS Brunswick, ME, 22 March 93.
16. Mr. John Fleming, NAS Atlanta, GA, 19 March 93.
17. Mr. Jan Fluegge, Naval Shipyard Long Beach, CA, 12
March 93.
18. Mr. Mike Stewart, Naval Construction Battalion Center
Port Hueneme, CA, 19 March 93.
19. Mr. Tom Hackney, NSWC Dahlgren, VA, 18 March 93.
20. Mr. Harold Ralston, NSWC Bethesda, MD, 19 March 93.
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APPENDIX E. ACTIVITY TRANSPORTATION DATA TABLES
Column heading explanations
TOT S's/MI (toD line) -- total direct costs for entire
administrative vehicle fleet divided by mileage accumulated
for the year on all administrative vehicles.
Number mechanics -- number of mechanics at the activity that
work on administrative vehicles.
Number MGR/Admin -- number of managers, supervisors, and
administrative employees in the transportation organization.
Main assictnment -- the predominant vehicle assignment at the
activity, A (to an individual), B (to an organization), or C
(motor pool vehicle). Where an activity provided the percent
of the fleet in the main assignment, this percentage is
recorded.
Remote location -- is the activity more than 30 miles from a
major population center.
Fuel cost per gallon -- average price paid for unleaded fuel
during FY '92. This information was provided by the
transportation director at each activity.
Avg labor rate -- total labor dollars divided by the total
number of labor hours. Figured from information on the TCR.
Veh code -- alpha code category.
-- number of vehicles in each category at the activity.
% of fleet -- percentage of the administrative vehicle fleet
represented by each category.
QDTKMI -- downtime hours divided by the miles driven in each
category.
Miles/Veh -- average number of miles driven per each vehicle
in each category.
Avg model year -- the average model year of the vehicles in
each category.
88
Fuel, labor. and mat'l $'s per mile -- the total amount spent
for fuel, labor, and materials, respectively, in each category
divided by the miles driven in that category.
Tot S's Rer mile -- the sum of the fuel, labor, and materials




TOT NUIIER NUIBER DOING MAIN IITE FUEL CWST AVG LABOR
S's/RI I EOXAICS IraADfIN PH's ASSIOIINI LOCATION PER GAL RATE ($1's&l)
$0.22 8 6 YES 8(80%) No $0.83 18.47
IVI DT/II! AVG FIEL $'s LABOR S's PAT'L S's TOT v's
CODE # % OF FLEET (HS/RI) RILES/VEH MODEL YEAR PER RILE PER RILE PER MILE pER RILE
A 25 8.81 12V 3400 $ 0.04 $0.11 *0.06 *0.21
8 15 5.3% 174 4733 $ 0.09 $0.24 $0.06 $0.39
E 8 2.8% 12 500 $ 0.04 $0.07 $0.04 $0.16
G 104 36.5% 90 4719 $ 80.06 $0.06 $0.03 SO.17
H , 66 23.2% 94 4803 $ *0.06 $0.09 *0.03 $0.19
I5 1.8% 141 4600 $ *0.05 $0.11 $0.04 $0.20
J 35 12.25 190 1771 $ *0.09 *0.20 *0.07 *0.35
K 2 0.7% 34 3500 t *0.06 $0.07 $0.06 *0.22
0 24 8.4% 173 4167 $ 60.07 $0.14 $0.05 $0.26
N 1 0.3% 8 6000 * *0.05 $0.03 $0.10 $0.18
T HI TRAiIAWPTATION FIUCWTIi FOR HAS JAX WAS TAKEN OVER BY PUBLIS
IM 'FLEET AGE' iasW FOR DEIR FY '92 FLEET ARE M I AVAILABLE.
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iMB ADAK
-lT mIE matR DOING PAIN RE1TE REL CMST AVG LABOR
$IS/HI IEIANICS RIGADRIiN PHI's ASSI(MET LOCATION PER GAL RATE (V'sHIIJ
$0.15 4 3 YES 8(9011 YES $0.80 $25.00
V51 DT/KMI AVG FIEL $'s LABOR $'s PAT'L $'s TOT V's
CODE # OF FLEET IHRS/flCI) NILES/VEH MODEL YEAR PER NILE PER NILE PER RILE PER MILE
A 5 2.4% 50 5200 '88 $0.03 $0.06 $0.01 $0.09
B 18 8.85 94.2 28056 '85 $0.04 $0.03 $0.03 S0.11
G 64 31.2% 121 11687 '84 $0.04 $0.06 $0.03 $0.12
H 68 33.25 93.2 13441 '86 $0.07 $0.05 $0.03 $0.15
i 13 6.3% 38 7538 '85 $0.07 $0.16 $0.08 $0.31
K 12 5.9% 387 6500 '83 $0.04 $0.13 $0.06 $0.23
R 15 7.3 992 2333 '82 $0.11 $0.33 $0.12 $0.56
N 10 4.9% 1509 2800 '84 $0.12 $0.30 $0.18 $0.60
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NM IMIDIA
-1DT NME MISlER DOING PAIN EOTE REL COST AVG LABR
S's/I MECHANICS M/ARIN PH's ASSIGhENT LOCATION PR GAL RATE 1$Ss/HR)
$0.21 12 5 YES SEMI $0.66 S20.13
EH DT/XII AVG FUEL $'s LAOR V's PAT'L $'s ; •T $'s
CME # S OF FLEET IIRS/IKII RILES/VEH MR YEAR PER MILE -PE RILE PER MILE PER RILE
A 7 5.0% 2.8 9286 '89 $0.03 $0.02 *0.004 $0.06
3 2 1.4% 13.6 13500 '89 $0.09 $0.07 *0.01 $0.18
D 1 0.7% 49.8 8000 '62 $0.13 $0.11 $0.02 $0.26
G 57 41.0% 19 4281 '89 $0.05 $0.07 $0.02 $0.14
H 42 30.2% 26.4 5176 '69 $0.07 $0.09 $0.02 $0.18
i 13 9.4% 37.7 6538 '85 $0.11 $0.17 $0.06 $0.34
K 8 5.8% 85.3 3750 '82 $0.12 $0.28 $0.06 $0.46
H 9 6.5% 77 2111 '84 $0.42 $0.41 $0.30 $1.13
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NSWC DAELGREN
TOT WRIEi Nll ER DOIGW FAIN WUE FUEL MST AVG LABOR
$'s/NI IRIDUICS N/ADMIN PI's ASSIOE LOCTION PER GAL RATE ($'s/IRI
OJ38 10 4 YES C18a%) NO $0.91 $20.62
194 IT/KNI AVG FL s LABOR 's NAT'L $'s TOT $'s
MOE S % OF FLEET (HIIS/MI) NILESIVEH MIOEL YEAR PER NILE PER NILE PER NILE PER MILE
A 16 4.75 38 10063 '88 $0.03 $0.05 $0.02 .0.10
1 1 0.3% 43 3000 '90 80.08 $0.25 80.06 Vn.41
E 5 1.55 16 11000 '88 0.10 $0.04 80.02 0.16
G 91 26.85 6 5495 '88 $0.05 $0.06 $0.04 $0.17
N 120 35.35 38 6300 '89 $0.05 $0.06 $0.03 $0.14
i 29 8.65 61 4690 '88 80.09 $0.18 $0.10 $0.38
J 16 4.75 70 5313 '85 $0.02 $0.09 $0.05 $0.16
K 30 8.85 111 4000 '88 $0.05 $0.14 $0.06 80.25
R 29 8.6% 159 3690 '87 $0.06 $0.19 $0.13 $0.38
N 2 0.6% 41 14500 '92 $0.12 $0.05 $3.56 83.73
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NSWC BETHESDA
T70T UER IIER D1ING MAIN MITE FUEL COST AVG LABOR
'sl"I MECHIANICS NMPADiIN P's ASSIGNMENT LOCATION PER GAL RATE Is's/IH)
$0.24 21 2 YES C(80%I Hk* $0.68 $26.96
194 DT/KMI AVG FUEL $'s LABOR $Is NAT'L $'s TOT V's
CODE # S OF FLEET IHWS/KNI) MILES/VH IIMOEL YEAR PER NILE PER RILE PER MILE PER RIL•
A 6 5.8% 15 3667 '85 $0.04 $0.14 $0.06 $0.24
3 1 1.0% 119 1000 '79 $0.11 $0.22 $0.65 $0.98
E 10 9.6% 17 10400 '86 $0.03 $0.06 $0.08 $0.17
G 25 24.0% 23 4240 '87 $0.05 $0.09 $0.08 $0.23
H 33 31.71% 16 3818 '80 $0.06 $0.11 $0.06 $0.24
1 8 7.7% 23 4000 '84 $0.11 $0.07 $0.03 $0.21
K 9 8.7% 4 5444 '85 $0.09 $0.03 $0.01 $0.12
a to 9.65 20 6800 '83 $0.10 $0.12 $0.13 $0.35
N 2 1.9" 9 21000 '89 $0.10 $0.07 $0.18 $0.34
NOTE: TIE VEHICLE FLEET FOR I= BETHESDA IS SIEAM OVE A RMIER OF ACTIVITIES.
94
WPNSTA CHARLESTON
TOT NUMER MiER DOING MAIN RUT RUEL 00ST AVG LBR
S's/Nl IEOMANICS MIGVADIN PM's ASSIGQWT LCATION PER GAL RTE (t's/Il)
W0.18 11 YES B1755) NO $0.81 $19.55
UDi DT/KMI AVG RFEL V's LABOR $'s MT'L $'s TOT S's
CDE # OF FLEET (HRS/KNII i ILES/VEH WOVEL YEAR PER MILE PER MILE PER MILE PER MILE
A 25 3.9% 38.4 16640 '88 $0.01 $0.05 $0.04 $0.10
B 12 1.9% 153.1 3500 '88 $0.07 $0.19 $0.19 $0.45
E 1 0.2% 0 4000 NO LISTING IN LISTING NO LISTING NO LISTING NO LISTING
6 266 41.9% 32.3 6917 '88 $0.04 $0.04 $0.03 $0.11
H 129 20.35 65.4 7248 '88 $0.04 $0.06 $0.05 $0.15
1 74 11.75 73.1 8500 '87 $0.06 $0.06 $0.06 $0.17
J 11 1.75 22 4273 '87 $0.03 $0.31 $0.19 $0.53
K 18 2.8% 92 3000 '87 $0.13 $0.27 $0.28 $0.69
N 74 11.75 99.2 3203 '88 $0.09 $0.19 $0.23 $0.51
N 24 3.85 332 2250 '86 $0.11 $0.48 $0.44 $1.03
95
sUBABE NEW LONDON
TOT vim MNel DOING PAIN RENOT REL MST AVG LAM
s/ORHI lEOIANICS MG/PADIN I'l Pl's ASSIGN9 LOCATION PER GAL RATE IS's/HR)
80.18 8 6 NO B(60%) NO $0.80 $16.78
151 DTIKHI AVG FUEL. V's LABOR V's NAT'L $'s 10T $I's
OD # S OF FLEET IIWS/ICi) MILES/YIN OVDEL YEAR M•R1MILE PER MILE PER 11ILE PER MILE
A 44 16.6% 20.2 8545 '68 $0.04 $0.02 $0.03 *0.09
B 5 1.9% 57.4 3800 '88 *0.11 $0.05 $0.15 $0.31
D 1 0.4% 21.7 23000 '86 $0.07 $0.14 10.23 *0.43
E 11 4.2% 13.8 9272 '86 $0.02 $0.02 $0.03 *0.06
G 101 38.1i 24 5267 '88 $0.05 $0.10 $0.03 *0.18
H 56 21.15 4.3 6786 '85 $0.07 $0.12 $0.04 $0.23
i 12 4.5% 40.3 2833 '84 $0.13 $0.04 $0.06 $0.23




-TOT lium mR DOING MIN 1FIR FIEl MST AVG LOW
S's/RI MEDIANICS PIG/ADIN PR's ASSIIG T LOCATION PER GAL RATE (4s/'sRI
$0.22 2 3 YES C1M5%) NO $0.80 $21.00
VD•rlT/KI AVG FUEL $'s LADR S's HAT'L S's TOT $'s
CODE # OF RET (IWSM/I) RILES/VEH IMOEL YEAR PER RILE PER RILE PER RILE PER RILE
A 10 17.21 2.4 11200 '85 $0.06 $0.06 $0.05 $0.17
3 2 3.4% 8.4 3500 '77 $0.06 $0.16 $0.18 $0.45
E 3 5.2% 2.7 7667 '87 S0.06 $O.0 *0.04 $0.15
C 11 19% 3.2 4818 '87 $0.06 $0.07 $0.09 $0.22
H 14 24.1% 1.9 7357 '88 $0.06 *0.04 $0.02 0.13
1 5 8.6% 9.8 1600 '80 $0.13 $0.19 $0.08 $0.40
J 4 6.9% 1.6 1250 '186 $0.06 $0.06 SO.15 $0.27
K 3 5.2% 3.7 5000 '81 $0.05 $0.06 $0.04 $0.16
R 6 10.3% 26.6 2333 '74 $0.07 $0.47 $0.72 $1.26
97
NAWC LAZEN1W.IT
TOT MU R E  DOING PAIN IBMTE FUEL COST AVG LABOR
$'s/NI I EOIAICS GIN/ADRIN PH's ASSIGNIENT LOUCATION PER GAL RATE ('s/HIl)
$0.21 5 5 YES NO 60.84 $17.14
VEN DT/KNI AVG FUEL. $'s LABOR $'s PAT'L S's TOT $'s
COE # % OF FLEET IHRS/KI) I ILES/VEN MODEL YEAR PER NILE PER NILE PER RILE FR NILE
A 17 6.95 74 11647 'g8 10.01 10.06 $0.06 60.13
3 4 2.15 964 1500 '16 $0.20 60.21 10.05 $0.47
E 10 5.25 61.7 7000 '66 $0.03 $0.11 10.05 60.19
G 53 27.71% 179 4434 'l9 60.07 60.06 $0.06 $0.19
H 49 2.7% 116 5571 '69 10.06 $0.07 60.06 $0.20
i 21 115 335 4667 '67 $0.13 60.11 60.09 60.33
1 13 6.85 141 2000 '83 *0.12 10.09 60.10 $0.31
K 9 4.7% 805 1178 '90 $0.11 $0.24 60.06 60.43
M 13 6.86 402 3461 '85 60.06 $0.17 $0.26 $0.48
N 2 1.05 36 14000 '66 60.09 $0.02 60.02 60.12
98
N1M CORPUS CHRISTI
TOT NiEm MUSER DOING MAIN a l FOER COST AVG LABOR
$'9/11I MECHANICS MWJ/AIIN PN's ASIGWIENT LOCATION PER GAL RATE t$'s/fR)
60.23 8 5 BEHIND 3(755) NO $0.83 $17.27
YBI DT/KMI AVG FIEL $'s LABOR $'s NAT'L $'s TOT s's
CODE # S OF FLEET WSI/KNI MILES/VEH NODEL YEAR PER MILE PER MILE PER MILE PER NILE
A 27 7.9% 91.2 6926 '68 $0.05 $0.09 $0.02 $0.16
3 2 0.61 781 500 '83 $0.54 $2.80 00.46 $3.80
E 14 4.15 214 2500 '86 $0.03 $0.21 60.05 $0.29
G 185 54.1% 52.8 1789 '85 $0.07 $0.11 $0.04 $0.22
H 26 7.65 55.2 6692 '87 $0.06 $0.16 $0.03 $0.25
i 11 3.25 84.6 3636 '84 $0.06 $0.09 $0.04 50.19
I 11 3.25 NO TI4M DATA AVAILABLE
K 17 5.05 194 2353 '82 50.10 $0.25 $0.05 $0.39
R 49 14.35 884 245 '83 $0.09 $0.64 $0.28 $1.01
99
NAB BRUNSWICK
-.TOT UImma mIER DOING "AIN 9tE FUEL OMST AVG UECR
$'sIMI PEQOAICS HIR/ADRIN PH's ASSIG(IEV LOCATION PER CL. RATE (5's/1I4t
$0.07 3 3 II I Sol *0.81 $17.77
194 DT/KI! AVG FEl $'s LASO $'s NMT'L $'s TOT $'s
MOE # % OF FLEET IlS/KIM) RILESIV•E MOMEL YEAR PlER RILE PER MILE PER NILE PER MILE
A 10 5.5% 38 18100 '86 $0.10 10.01 $0.003 *0.11
3 4 2.2% -481 3000 '87 *0.04 $0.26 $0.20 *0.50
E 5 2.7% 316 5000 '86 $0.06 0.12 $0.06 $0.25
F 2 1.1% 19 2000 '80 80.04 $0.10 *0.05 *0.19
G 43 23.55 49 10163 'se $0.01 10.03 $0.02 $0.07
H 64 355 56 15375 '87 10.03 $0.03 $0.01 $0.07
I 24 13.1% 16 34792 '87 $0.01 $0.02 $0.01 *0.03
J 7 3.8% 11 133143 '65 *0.01
K 7 3.8% 65 4571 '86 $0.01 $0.11 $0.04 $0.16
11 6.0% 357 1909 '81 $0.05 $0.09 $0.04 $0.18
N 6 3.3% 181 2667 '85 $0.13 $0.14 80.06 *0.35
100
NAS OC..AiA
TOT MISER MlER DOING IPAIN RIOET FUEL RST AVG LABOR
S's/llI IECMANICS NIIIA•DIN PHs ASSIGNIIT OCATION PER GAL RATE 1S's/ll )
$0.25 4 5 NST I NO $0.83 $117.82
194 DTI/KI AVG FIEL S's LABOR $'s IAT'L $'s TOT I's
ODE # % OF FLEET IHIRSINI) MILES/VYE MiDEL YEAR PER NILE PER NILE PER MILE PER NILE
A 8 4.1% 253 3000 $ S0.05 $0.07 $0.02 $0.14
3 7 3.6% 105 8286 $ 0.08 $0.14 $0.11 $0.34
E 5 2.6% 54.5 8200 $ 0.05 $0.03 $0.02 $0.09
G 65 33.5% 5.6 7292 $ 0.06 $0.09 $0.01 $0.15
H 52 26.8% so 5211 $ 0.11 $0.11 $0.02 $0.25
1 26 13.4% 200 3692 $ 0.17 $0.16 $0.09 $0.43
J 10 5.2% 531 2600 $ 0.17 $0.65 $0.33 $1.14
K 9 4.6% 10 4667 $ 0.05 $0.05 $0.02 $0.12
11 13 6.7% 110 3615 $0.05 $0.25 10.15 $0.44
N 1 0.5% 6.6 16000 $ 0.18 $0.11 $0.01 $0.30
U lIE 71MiIPMRTATION FUICTION FOR IAS OMANA WAS TAKEN OVER BY PIBLIC MWS CENTER NiORFLK IN FY '93.
WE 'FLEET AGE" REO)RDS FOR 'i1EII FY '92 FLEET AME NO LONER AVAILABLE.
101
NAB GLENVIEW
TOT NUIR KMIER DOING MAIN IBTM REL CO)ST AVG LABOR
S's/ IEGiANICS IIM/ADRIN PH'S ASSIGINT LOCATION PER GAL RATE I$'s/lHR)
$0.33 4 3 YES NO $0.74 $21.34
VEB DT/YII AVG FUEL $'s LAB0R $'s HAT'L $'s TOT $'s
CODE # OF FLEET (IFS/KMI) MILES/VEH MI.EL YEAR PER MILE PER BILE PER BILE PER NILE
A 4 9.5% 49 7143 '87 $0.12 $0.34 $0.05 $0.50
3 6 8.1% 116 4667 'l1 $0.21 $0.17 $0.06 $0.46
E 3 4.1% 3 6000 '86 $0.06 10.03 $0.04 $0.15
G 13 17.6% 29 4846 '87 $0.05 $0.03 $0.06 $0.14
H 24 32.4% 107 4458 '86 $0.05 $0.08 $0.10 $0.23
I 12 16.2% 123 3917 '83 $0.13 $0.55 $0.04 $0.72
J 3 4.1% 154 2667 0.10 $0.05 $0.09 $0.24
N 6 8.1% 105 3500 '83 $0.05 $0.06 $0.04 $0.15
102
NAB SOUTH WRZYNOUT
TOT KnUER IMER DOING PAIN REI RTEL CST AVG LABOR
's1/111 IMECHANICS M/ADIN PH's ASSIGMENT LOCATION PER GAL RATE I$'slHR)
$0.21 5 2 NO B146%) NO $0.81 $18.74
VEI DT/KNI AVG FUEL S's LABOR S's NAT'L $'s TOT $'s
CODE IS OF FLEET IHES/DKI) RILES/VEH NODEL YEAR PER NILE PER RILE PER NILE PER MILE
A 12 16.2% 112 13090 '88 $0.05 $0.05 $0.02 $0.12
3 1 1.4% 52 4500 '81 $0.13 10.25 $0.09 10.47
E 1 1.4% 53 6000 '88 $0.03 $0.08 IEGLIGIBLE $0.11
G 13 17.65 107 4692 '87 $0.06 $0.09 $0.02 $0.17
H 29 39.1% 59 7357 '87 $0.06 $0.07 $0.04 $0.17
I 7 9.5% 127 1600 '84 $0.12 $0.62 $0.24 $0.98
J 1 1.4% 325 4000 NO LISTING $0.06 $0.80 $0.18 $1.06
K 5 6.8% 78 2864 '84 $0.06 $0.13 $0.05 $0.24
N 5 6.8% 107 2861 '83 $0.11 $0.24 $0.14 $0.49
H NOTES FROM HOST RECENT I NA(IIENT ASSIST VISIT INCLUDE: EXCESSIVE NUMER OF HIQI HILEAGE TRIPS KEING IADE, NEED
NED TO NON1711 EWOW.S MOE CAMFULLY, NEED T0 ESTABLISH UP TO DATE RENTAL RATES FOR REIMIBRSABLE OCSTOEM .
103
NAS LENOORE
l1T MISER NIMER DOING RAIN N1MTE FUEL COQST AVG LABOR
$'s/"i IEQAN|ICS rV/ADflIN PH's ASSIGNENT LOCATION PR GAL RkTE IS'sI/H)
0.13 18 4 ? YES $1.13 $9.52
VEN DT/KMI AVG FUEL S's LABOR $'s MAT'L $'s TOT I's
CODE # OF FLEET (HUSIKMI I KILESIVEH MODEL YEAR PER MILE PER MILE PER NiLE PER RILE
A 21 8% 483 6285 '86 $0.06 $0.06 S0.07 $0.19
B 14 5.4% 323 11929 '85 $0.13 $0.05 $0.03 $0.21
E 1 0.4% 80 28000 S0.04 $0.02 $0.01 $0.07
G 123 47.1% 167 8797 '87 $0.05 $0.04 $0.02 $0.14
H 55 21.1% 122 13400 '90 $0.04 $0.03 *0.02 $0.11
1 20 7.7% 567 3250 '85 $0.13 $0.10 $0.07 $0.38
K 15 5.7% 939 2133 '65 $0.18 $0.27 $0.16 $0.61
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